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On exactly the same July day in 1986, two federal courts diverged in the dimly
charted woods of student free expression.' In one case, Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
School District,2 the Eighth Circuit overturned a federal district court to hold that a
high school administrator may not delete sensitive stories written by students from
an official school newspaper, unless the administrator can show that publication
would create substantial disorder or would subject the school to tort liability. In the
other case, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,3 the Supreme Court
overturned, 7-2, decisions of both a federal district court and the Ninth Circuit to
hold that a high school administrator may discipline a student for a vulgar speech in
a school assembly, even when the speech caused neither a material disruption nor
harm to others.
The widely differing perspectives of these cases reflect the uncertainties and
contradictions that characterize today's constitutional rulings involving public school
students. They also underscore the need-part of an emerging national need for
educational reform-to develop a coherent first amendment theory for public
education that will stablize and encourage sound educational structures for the long
range benefit of students in American schools. As a step toward such a theory, this
Article suggests that courts should presume the constitutional validity of rational
decisions by public school officials that implicate educational matters, both curricular
and extra-curricular. This rebuttable presumption of an institution's educational
autonomy is grounded in interests associated with students' right to be taught the
values underlying the first amendment. The schools' role in nurturing those values is
clarified by understanding that public schools are not typical arms of the bureaucratic
state, but are unique "mediating" institutions having historical and conceptual ties to
both the public and private sectors.
INTRODUCION
The point of departure for virtually all student free expression analysis over the
last twenty years was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,4
a peaceful protest case from the Vietnam War era, in which the Supreme Court first
held that public school students are entitled to some forms of first amendment
protection. Eighteen years after Tinker, the Supreme Court reached a more restrictive
result in the Fraser case-perhaps on grounds that the expression in Fraser was
vulgar rather than political, as it was in Tinker. However, the Fraser Court appeared
to signal some interest in a broader perspective on student speech. Stating that "the
process of educating our youth for citizenship" is "not confined to books, the
1. Both opinions were handed down on July 7, 1986.
2. 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987). Forsome discussion of the case, see infra
text accompanying notes 287-88.
3. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 136-44 and 289-94.
4. The Court held that students' free speech interests protected their right to wear black armbands on the school
grounds in protest against the government's conduct of the war, so long as their symbolic speech did not cause a
substantial disturbance of or material interference in school activities. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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curriculum, and the civics class,"-5 the Court invoked the once antiquated doctrine of
in loco parentis 6 and cited Justice Black's dissent in Tinker. Justice Black had
predicted in 1969 that application of traditional free expression concepts to students
below the age of majority could seriously undermine discipline and, hence,
educational quality in American schools. 7 He viewed Tinker as a child of the
revolutionary 1960s, 8 a strange and unsettling period that challenged traditional
authority in ways that arguably contributed toward our becoming by the early 1980s
"a nation at risk" due to a weakened educational system.9 Fraser may thus begin to
clarify how courts should apply free expression concepts to students in the light of
post-Tinker experience in both the schoolhouse and the courthouse.
The differing perspectives on student expression represented by Tinker
and Fraser reflect the divergence between the 1960s and the 1980s on a multitude of
issues. They also echo a very old debate about the relationship between freedom
and discipline in both educational processes and theories of personal and
political development. In one sense this debate is but one more manifestation that
"Americans have a ... hang-up about authority," even as they also recognize
that "[e]ducation ... is by its nature an exercise in authority ... since the
teacher presumably seeks to impart something that the student does not or cannot
do."'
0
The degree of authority required to teach children and to preserve an educational
environment is fundamentally at odds with the anti-authoritarianism of the first
amendment tradition, because education by definition involves the imposition of
restraints. This dilemma illustrates that "[c]hildren are the Achilles heel of liberal
ideology," for, indeed, "[t]o make education compulsory" in the first place "was
itself to challenge liberal ideology."'" Some commentators argue that the schools'
authority must nonetheless be subject to the same free speech limitations as those
imposed on any governmental agency in order to protect students against state
indoctrination,' 2 to prevent the establishment of uniform political values, 13 to allow
5. 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986).
6. The Court recognized "the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in locoparentis
to protect children-especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." Id.
7. "1 . . .disclaim . . . that the federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials
to surrender control of the American public school system to public school students." 393 U.S. 503, 522, 526 (Black,
J., dissenting), quoted in 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986).
8. "[G]roups of students all over the land are already running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins, and
smash-ins." 393 U.S. 503, 525 (1969).
9. The College Board's Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) taken by high school seniors "demonstrate a virtually
unbroken decline from 1963 to 1980," a "rising tide of mediocrity" so serious that the nation was told in 1983 by the
much publicized National Commission on Excellence that it had "lost sight of the basic purposes of schooling." THE
NATo:AL Co.wsiSsox ox Excai..ucE IN EDC cAToN, A NATIoN AT RSK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDuCA-nONM. REr~osR 5 (1983)
[hereinafter A NATION AT RIsK]. This report was one of many during the early 1980s to reach similar conclusions. See infra
note 98 and section I.C.2.
10. Ravitch, The Continuing Crisis: Fashions in Education, 1984 THE A MERcAN ScHoLR 183, 189.
11. Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 647-48 (1980).
12. See Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment,
57 TEx. L. REv. 863 (1979).
13. See Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 ChAM. L. Rsv. 1104
(1979).
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the autonomous development of student beliefs, 14 and to teach students the processes
of democratic participation.t 5
These arguments clarify the freedom side of the tension between freedom and
discipline in the learning process, but they take little account of the risk that
weakened authority among teachers and administrators can undermine student
educational development-on which the sustaining of democratic values also
depends. Indeed, a strong educational tradition is a crucial prerequisite to maintaining
a strong tradition of individual rights. ' 6 Excessive student autonomy can impair the
most fundamental learning processes, which are finally the lifeblood of responsible
democratic participation. For example, if free speech is to be meaningful, a citizen
must have something worth saying, together with the maturity and the skill needed to
say it. Indeed, "freedom of expression" has two meanings: (1) freedom from
restraints upon expression and (2) freedom for expression-that is, having the
capacity for self-expression. Schools must be especially concerned with the second
meaning, interacting with students in ways unique among all interaction between the
individual and the state. They educate to enable expression, thus affirmatively
nurturing the values of the first amendment.
Unfortunately, experience since the 1960s now demonstrates that reductions of
discretionary authority in the schools and elsewhere have-along with other factors-
reduced support and guidance for children, creating a vacuum that has not been filled
with other sources of educational nurturing.' 7 While complex cause and effect
relationships are difficult to establish, some empirical connections have recently
emerged linking this decline in authority to declines in educational achievement.' 8
The Court thus handed down Fraser at a time when the debate over authority needed
closer attention to the schools' side of the equation, not to establish unbridled
discretion in ways that seriously threaten the right of students to development toward
autonomy, but to restore the balance needed to facilitate that same development over
the long term.
The need to shore up one side of a paradoxical equation in education is hardly
a new one. Our entire educational history has been like a pendulum swinging between
traditional, authoritative approaches to education and innovative, free wheeling
approaches. The nation experienced the "old school" rigor of Horace Mann during
14. See van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Government Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L.
REv. 197, 239 (1983) (arguing for the establishment of "a principle that would protect students from any effort by public
schools to inculcate pupils with political ideas, attitudes, viewpoints, ideologies, values or beliefs").
15. See Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public
School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986).
The arguments in these articles at times echo dominant themes from the 1960s. For example, one of the root ideas
from that era was "participatory democracy," which was embodied in the Port Huron statement of 1962 adopted by Tom
Hayden and other leaders of Students for a Democratic Society, having been inspired by C. WPGtrr MaILs, Tu Pow-m Eu-
(1956). See M. Vosr, FmE IN THE STRrEs: A IMCA IN TE 1960s 163-96 (1979). This idea has logical links to social science
literature developing the idea that, "If the family or school is authoritarian . . . the children learn to be submissive to
authority. A more democratic family or school is thought to predispose children to democratic values." Levin id. at 1654.
16. See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 605, 656-58.
17. "You don't replace something with nothing. Of course, that was exactly what the educational reform of the
sixties was doing." A. BLooM, THE CLsSING oF 'ME AMERCaN MINO 320 (1987).
18. See infra section I.C.
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the last half of the 19th century, followed by the broad view of schools as
socialization agents held by John Dewey and other advocates of Progressive
education. After a brief return to traditional standards following the Soviets' launch
of Sputnik in 1957, the late 1960s erupted into a period of unprecedented anti-
authoritarian innovations.
Following an unusually strong series of calls to return to higher academic
standards in the last few years, the educational pendulum is moving once more-even
if uncertainly-toward a reassertion of authority. As it moves, it now carries greater
weight from one side to the other, loaded with increasingly heavy social and political
policies in addition to its more traditional burden of teaching.
Because this historical pattern now interacts inevitably with the nation's legal
system, we need theories of constitutional law and legal policy that capture and
enable, rather than block or unravel, the productive and dynamic paradoxes that are
inherent in the educational process. The swings that have occurred in our educational
history (now being reflected in the swings of constitutional law) are but manifesta-
tions of paradoxical conflicts between legitimate and competing principles that deal
both with learning and with the important social purposes served by education.
Important paradoxes are inherent in the very idea of a state-operated school
system in a democratic society, an idea Professor Franklin Zimring has described (as
it prevailed during the first half of this century) as "special case socialism at a time
when socialism was a dirty word." 19 A review of our educational history shows that
schools in the early days of the Republic were almost literally extensions of the home.
The tradition of local control of education has its roots in that era. Yet Jefferson and
others of his day saw great political and social value for the nation in making a
uniform system of education available to all its children. A predictable tension
between parents and the state as dual sources of authority for the schools has
continued and grown to the present day, creating a tangled political and organiza-
tional paradox. Here is a legal agency of the state-a public school-that is at once
an extension of the governmental sphere and an extension of the private family
sphere--"in loco parentis." It is a unique legal entity of dualistic origins. In applying
that paradox in students' lives, a school simultaneously helps students develop the
skills they need for personal autonomy as well as social cohesion. The student is both
person and citizen. In a democratic society, these conflicting roles do not force a
permanent choice, but are mutually reinforcing, despite the appearance of occasional
conflict. In assisting each student to accept this paradox, public schools are
institutions that mediate between the individual and the megastructures of society.
This is but one reason why their institutional uniqueness must find clearer expression
in our constitutional theory.
Consider other educational paradoxes. The most desirable mix of liberty and
discipline necessary for effective teaching and learning depends upon a host of
variables so complex as to defy abstract and generalizable prescription. At one time
a student may need the temporary repression of discipline in order to develop the
19. F. ZBIRMtL, THE CHANGLrN LEGAL VoRLI OF AmOz.scEcE 35 (1982).
1987]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
skills necessary for genuine freedom. At other times, that same student may need to
be left completely free (perhaps even pushed to break free) to try his or her creative
wings.
We also expect the schools to teach principles of both revolution and preserva-
tion. On the one hand, inspired by Jefferson, we teach our children the spirit of the
Declaration of Independence, that they might be sufficiently self-reliant to recapture
political authority when it is abused by those entrusted with the power to govern. On
the other hand, inspired by Washington and Lincoln, we teach them the spirit of the
Constitution, that they might conserve existing institutions with "a passionately
rational reverence,''20 in order to ensure stability and continuity in our public
institutions.
A paradox arises from the commitment of the schools to equal educational
opportunities for all the nation's children, even as they also aspire to the excellence
of stretching the most gifted students. Our system has also been traditionally
committed to a foundation of moral commitment, even as it emphasizes the value of
free inquiry.2 '
Another important paradox in the education of children arises from the status and
conditions of childhood. State compulsory education laws compel children to attend
school, violating what would be the most fundamental liberties of adults. Our
tradition asserts that this compulsion is in the best interest of children, because
education ultimately develops their capacity to enjoy the full and meaningful exercise
of their adult liberties. Throughout the legal system and society, our laws discrimi-
nate on the basis of age by placing restrictions on the right of minors to vote, contract,
or marry. In an age when discrimination is thought to be harmful in any guise,
American society continues to believe that age discrimination can advance the best
interests of its young people. In the paradox involving discriminationfor children, we
advance their liberty by limiting it.22
20. E. BRANN, PARADoxES OF EDUCATION I A REPUBUC 43 (1979).
21. Compared with private, religious education, public education has naturally placed its primary emphasis on the
fundamentals of open inquiry and the assumption of multiple paths to educational truth. The doctrine of separation of
church and state as well as the obligation of public schools to an increasingly diverse constituency have reinforced the
sense of neutrality inherent in the public schools as state-sponsored institutions. Yet the public school tradition, reflected
in everything from the copybook headings to the pledge of allegiance, also includes a commitment to both personal
character and public virtue. The idea that education was essential to the theory of democracy depended in no small part
on the assumption that education would aid the development of these general abilities and attitudes as universally shared
matters of value.
Developments in recent years, however, have revealed considerable difficulty in our ability to deal with the paradox
of diversity and unity on questions of value as well as the paradox of blending free inquiry with matters of moral
commitment. Professor Stephen Aarons has observed that the court-ordered removal of "religious teaching and
observance" from the public schools since the early 1960s has apparently been followed by the unnecessary and at times
unwitting removal in many schools of an entire range of "beliefs, commitments, and passionately held values" underlying
"the most enduring questions of civilization and human nature." Action and attitudes of this kind have not necessarily
been mandated by the courts, but are unfortunately assumed to be the logical extension of the reasoning behind the religion
cases by many "citizens, school officials, and teachers wary of . . . conflict . . . that might breed trouble."
Commentary, EDUCATION NV.EK, Nov. 7, 1984, at 24. See infra text accompanying notes 183-84.
22. Family life creates the first and most pervasive authoritarian structure children experience. Our laws protect the
right of parents constantly to make decisions affecting their children-frequently with arguably negative consequences-
because legal protection for the autonomous discretion of parents is essential if the nurturing developmental capabilities
of relationships based on kinship are to take root and, over time, bear the fruit of deeply felt commitments. If law
intervenes too easily in these relationships, the relationships are constantly uprooted, and the fruit may never come to
[Vol. 48:663
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In all of these areas of paradox in the lives of school-age children, parents,
teachers, and other adults who function in custodial and teaching roles make
paternalistic decisions constantly, weighing the merits of the conflicting principles in
each situation: order and liberty, inquiry and inculcation, love and discipline. On a
given day with a given child, the judgmental preference may well be toward one side
of the paradox; the next day with another child, one prefers the other. These are
matters of discretion. The educational and parenting processes are saturated with this
elusive, subtle, and ultimately unsupervisable necessity. Thus, despite our grand
educational visions and our recurring focus upon large social abstractions, in reality
"the effort of the single teacher is the ultimate resort of excellence in education." 2 3
How can the law, constitutional or otherwise, with its crude, rough instruments,
enhance such complex processes? Surely law must protect vulnerable young people
from serious abuses of adult discretion, but it must do so without destroying the
learner's confidence in her teacher.2 4 The law's capacity to undermine wise discretion
is far greater than its capacity to improve it. Moreover, the law has a deeply ingrained
propensity-its strength as well as its weakness-to resolve paradoxes by splitting
them, favoring one principle over another, because strong constitutional presump-
tions prevail over all opposition or because a "result" is necessary in a given case.
More specifically, how does the first amendment's grand commitment to free
expression apply to public school students? The needs of children often call for
restraints on liberty of expression in order to teach the values of expression.
Moreover, rather than posing a threat to a child's interests in expression, schools are
dedicated fundamentally to developing the very values for which the first amendment
stands. Our analysis of freedom of expression claims for children in schools thus
requires greater sophistication than merely stating our preference for one side of the
paradoxical equations inherent in educational development.
Public education seeks affirmatively to teach the capacity to enjoy first
amendment values-to mediate between ignorance and educated expression. It is a
process that invites intrusion, requires authoritarian paternalism, and depends upon
the exercise of unsupervisable discretion. There must be legal protection against
clearly harmful abuse of this flexibility, but without some strong influence from those
apparent enemies of personal autonomy in the educational process, little serious
education is possible. Traditional first amendment jurisprudence was never designed
to deal with governmental action of this kind, because the original cases arose in
contexts involving adults and were concerned only with when to limit governmental
action, not with how to encourage it toward such complex ends as educational
development. In schools, as in other contexts primarily involving the young,
"children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories
blossom. Short of legal standards for abuse and neglect, we leave children at lesser but still significant forms of risk,
because experience teaches us no better means of child development. In the paradox of belonging based on love, the bonds
of family life can bring fulfillment rather than bondage.
23. BRsiN, supra note 20, at 5.
24. For discussion of the relationship between educational achievement and school authority patterns, see infra
section I.C.2.
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and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically
transferred to determination of a state's duty toward children.'' 25
As will be shown below, the Supreme Court's public school cases have already
begun to develop a special brand of constitutional law that in sometimes awkward
ways shows the broad outlines of a sui generis kind of jurisprudence. To this pattern
should be added the idea of affirmative first amendment protection for the role of
public schools as mediating institutions involved uniquely in developing and
transmitting constitutionally protected values. Within this vision, the paradoxes of
education can remain in place, to be applied, adjusted, and worked through for the
benefit of each individual child by individual teachers and individual administrators
in the small communities of learning we call schools.
Part I of this Article reviews the origins and purposes of public schools,
considering both the private and the public heritage. It reviews changes in our social
and political assumptions regarding child-oriented historical movements, giving
special attention to the "reform" era of the 1960s, which challenged the assumptions
of the previous half-century. This Part then offers some observations about reform
efforts in child-centered institutions in the 1960s and 1970s, which include recent
flourishes of interest in restoring higher academic standards to the schools, perhaps
in part to regain some of the educational losses incurred in the post-1960 reforms. Part
I concludes that our attitudes toward public schools and children are currently in a
state of profound ambivalence.
Part II seeks to clarify our current uncertainties by arguing that public schools
should be understood as "mediating institutions" between individuals and the state,
rather than being seen only as extensions of the state bureaucracy whose intrusion into
students' personal expression is presumptively chilling. In this vision, as shown by
the application of first amendment theory to children, educational institutions are
themselves entitled to certain forms of first amendment protection as a means of
developing among their students the values guaranteed by our system of freedom of
expression. When schools are seen in this mediating role, many issues that appear to
raise constitutional questions will be understood as issues that primarily raise
questions of educational policy.
Part III reviews the Supreme Court cases that have recently introduced the
doctrine of institutional academic freedom, then applies that first amendment
perspective to the problems of student expression in extracurricular activities.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Origins and Purposes of American Schools
From its beginning, the American public school movement was built upon three
major interests: the interest of parents in providing for the education of their children,
the child's personal interest in education, and society's interest in an educated
25. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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citizenry. The child's right to education is treated as part of the first amendment
theory discussed in Section I.C.2. This Section A. is concerned primarily with the
historical development of parental and societal interests in education.
1. Extensions of Home, Family, and Local Community
Both chronologically and conceptually, the education of American children was
originally viewed as a natural extension of family life and parental interests. As
recipients of delegated parental authority, the schools empowered by this heritage
have long nurtured children through the entire complex of intellectual and social
processes necessary to the development of personal autonomy and public citizenship.
The courts and other non-educational agencies have generally deferred to this
authority for many of the same reasons that led to our longstanding tradition of
nonintervention in family life.
In the ancient societies of Athens and Rome, both of which were more deeply
committed to the idea of education than were the European medieval societies,
parents assumed primary responsibility for the education of children.26 The very
concept of childhood, let alone the notion of prolonged education for children, took
on reduced meaning during the Middle Ages. 27 But with the Reformation's
commitment to Bible literacy and the Enlightenment's new faith in the power of
reason, the idea of education for children returned with full vigor.
Because political and religious leaders also saw during this period that
educational practices had a powerful effect on the attitudes and skills of succeeding
generations, the role of the family in education was much debated, with differing
results in various nations. Germany and France took an early lead in the development
of centralized state school systems during the 18th and 19th centuries, but the English
tradition preferred, on grounds of both religious and political theory, parental control
and private education. 28 While the German, French, and English attitudes all
influenced the development of American schools, the English emphasis on private
control was-with the exception of the New England colonies-dominant in the
colonial era. Massachusetts first introduced a formal public interest in education with
laws adopted in 1642 and 1647, although even these laws placed primary obligation
to provide education upon parents. 29
The nationalism and the optimism of the revolutionary era moved the nation
strongly in the direction of establishing a system of free, public schooling; however,
the public debate over the proper relationship between state and parental interests
grew increasingly intense throughout the 19th century and continues to the present
day. The general momentum in this debate, despite occasional pauses and diversions,
has moved for two centuries in the direction of greater emphasis on governmental
26. See J. CARCOPLNO, DAILY LIFE IN ANciET RoME (1940); J. MAHAFY, SOCIAL IFE IN GRE CE FROM HOME TO M ANDER
(1902).
27. See P. ARIES, CEN-URIES OF CHILDHOOD (1962).
28. J. BRUBACIER. A HIsTORY OF THE PROBLEMS OF EDvcA-nON 540-47 (1947).
29. Id. at 547-50.
1987]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
control. Nonetheless, the family/private side of the argument has enjoyed moments
of notable significance in the development of our constitutional and political theory.
In 1816, for example, the legislature of New Hampshire attempted to transform
Dartmouth College into a state institution as part of a "new national spirit" in
education;30 however, accepting Daniel Webster's celebrated argument, the Supreme
Court overturned the state's action as an unconstitutional impairment of a private
contract. 31 A century later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,32 the Supreme Court again
protected private, parental choice in education. Pierce culminated the longstanding
struggle in which private, religious education (primarily Catholic schools) had sought
accomodation with the movement toward state-financed and state-mandated public
schools. 33 Rejecting an attempt by the State of Oregon to require compulsory public
school education, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional primacy of parental control
over the education of children in a democratic society. 34
Pierce, which built upon doctrine introduced in Meyer v. Nebraska just two
years earlier, 35 was described by the Court almost fifty years later as "a charter of the
rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.' '36 The Court
viewed the constitutional place of parents not only in religious liberty terms protected
by the first amendment, but as "an enduring American tradition" of "parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children" 37 protected by the due
process liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court also reaffirmed in Pierce the state's general power to establish
compulsory education laws and educational standards for private education in
satisfaction of the state's parens patriae duty to educate children for the larger benefit
of society. 38 This balance represents the theoretical framework in which parents may
direct the education of their children in ways that also satisfy significant state interests.
30. E. CUBBERLY, THE His'ORY OF EDuCATION 706 (1920).
31. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Webster's own mixed views
captured the conflict of his day between the overlapping public and private interests in education. His position that private
property was vested with a public interest regarding education became an important plank in the platform of the public
school movement: "For the purpose of public instruction, we hold every man subject to taxation in proportion to his
property, and we look not to the question, whether he himself have, or have not, children to be benefited by the education
for which he pays. We regard it as a wise and liberal system of police, by which property, and life, and the peace of
society are secured." 1 THE WoRKs OF DAsrjL WEsirE 41-42 (1885), quoted in BRUBACHER, supra note 28, at 527.
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. See BRUBACIER, supra note 28, at 560-67.
34. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
35. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
37. Id. at 232.
38. No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some
school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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Beyond the question of allocating responsibility for education, this theory also
reflects the fundamental, pluralistic assumptions of democracy, which presuppose "a
social system of family units, not just of isolated individuals." 39 These family units
do "not simply co-exist with our constitutional system"; rather, they are "an integral
part of it," because:
In democratic theory as well as in practice, it is in the family that children are expected to
learn the values and beliefs that democratic institutions later draw on to determine group
directions. The immensely important power of deciding about matters of early socialization
has been allocated to the family, not to the government.40
By contrast, controlling the system of value transmission is "a hallmark of
totalitarianism"; 4' therefore, "[flor obvious reasons, the state nursery is the
paradigm for a totalitarian society." '42 The notion that public schools are acting
pursuant to a delegation of primary authority from parents is thus a politically as well
as educationally significant idea in the democratic structure.
Because the idea of formal schooling has historical and conceptual roots that tie
it close to family life, the public school system has long nourished cooperation with
and some sense of accountability toward parents. The schools have been, at times
quite literally, in loco parentis: in the place of the parents. This natural link
influenced and was then reinforced by the tradition of local control and financing of
public education, which relies heavily on locally elected school boards and local
property tax revenues. The pattern of local control of education was historically so
strong that education is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution at all; yet nearly all
of the state constitutions require a system of public education. This state-assured
right, made specific in compulsory education laws, responds not only to children's
needs, but reflects the belief that "the stability of a republican form of government
[depends] mainly upon the intelligence of the people." ,43
Local control has been an important issue in debates over national educational
policy in the modem era. For example, despite widespread agreement about the need
for more and better shared educational resources, most early attempts to provide
federal financial aid to public education during the two decades following World War
II were turned back by widespread fears in Congress and elsewhere that, among other
risks, federal assistance would undermine community authority over education. 44 The
policy of local control also played a major role in the Supreme Court's 1973 decision
holding that comparatively inequitable funding among local school districts within a
single state did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 45 This case demonstrates the
39. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 765, 772
(1973).
40. Id. at 773.
41. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To E.wm%,ER PEopu: THE ROLE OF MEDIANG STRacnnpys iN PuBUc PoLucy 6 (1977).
42. D. MURPHEY, Bu.REAN CONSERVATSMI ANn CL.wsicAL Lmau.sS 270 (1979) (Modem Social and Political
Philosophies Series).
43. MeN. Cossr. of 1857, art. VIII, § 1.
44. D. RAvrrcH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AmER AcAN EucASION, 1945-1980 1, 6, 26-42 (1983).
45. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In addition to acknowledging that local
financial control allows each district the choice of devoting "more money to the education of one's children," the Court
noted "the opportunity [local control] offers for participation in the decision-making process that determines how
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continued validity of the idea that schools are extensions, and ultimately the
responsibility, of both local communities and the homes that comprise them.
Despite the well documented and still viable tradition of local control,
however, today's schools are influenced by a far more diffuse authority structure
than was the case but a generation ago. This significant change began with Brown v.
Board of Education,46 which called upon the public schools to assume the role of
direct state agents in the desegregation of society. In this role, schools acted not as
parental agents but as arms of the federal government, engaged in an immensely
important, complex task that was social, economic, and political as well as
educational in nature. Brown was followed by a series of wrenching changes in the
internal climate, the public expectations, and the govermental supervision of
American schools.47
The cumulative effect of these changes moved schools ever further from the
localized world of home and family toward the nationalized world of federal policy,
supervised by federal judges and agencies. As a result, it is today by no means clear
where the schools fit among the complex structures that reach from home and family
to the federal government. The in loco parentis tradition remains in place in much of
the public mind and throughout the school corridors, continuing to perform many of
public education's oldest roles. This tradition is a primary source of the discretionary,
parent-like authority of teachers and administrators, augmented by the doctrine of
parens patriae, which authorizes the state to care for dependent persons. But schools
as state agents have also assumed a new tradition backed by new forms of
governmental sponsorship. The reality is that a public school is cast in both public
and private roles, creating structural and philosophical ambiguities that are a
continuing source of tension and ambivalence in the minds of teachers and
administrators, as well as among students and the public. 48
2. The American Social Interest in Education
Although developments during the past thirty years have placed the schools in
new and demanding roles dictated by broad national policies, the nation's social
interest in its schools in fact has much older origins. The creation of the new
American nation gave early impetus to the idea of public schools as a source of both
political vitality and national unity. 49 Thomas Jefferson believed such a system would
help to ensure democratic society's ability to hold its elected leaders accountable
under the original political theory of the social contract embodied in the Declaration
these local tax dollars will be spent." Moreover, "[plluralism [which local control encourages] also affords some
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence." Id. at 50. Although
recognizing inequities in the funding provided by locally financed districts, the Court believed that this difficulty was
outweighed by the need to keep public schools within the control of the citizens whose taxes sustain them and whose
children attend them.
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See infra section I.B.
48. See infra section I.D.
49. See generally L. CRe.uN, AMEcAN EoucA-non: THE NAONAL ExERemrEcE 1783-1876 (1980). For a briefer
summary, see H. COMMAGER, THE PEOPLE AND THEm iScHooLs (1976).
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of Independence. 50 The idea of an enlightened citizenry was of course prerequisite to
the very idea of self-government.
Jefferson and such other figures as Benjamin Rush and Horace Mann also
persuaded their countrymen that education would create a needed sense of national
unity, not only as a matter of patriotic loyalty, but as a matter of common
understanding and language, forged in the egalitarian community of a public school
inhabited by children of all classes and origins. With the growth of immigration in the
late 19th century, the idea of public schools as national melting pots assumed wide
significance. The states gradually implemented these ideas through laws providing
for free, universal primary schools and, beginning in 1852 in Massachusetts, laws
requiring compulsory attendance. 5'
The advocates of national unity through public education were motivated in part
by a desire to overcome the potential for divisiveness they saw in the nation's
growing religious and ethnic diversity, even as they also saw a need for religious and
moral foundations in public education. The American school movement thus
developed during the middle 1800s a general sense of nonsectarian Christian morality
typified by the views of Horace Mann, whose "definition of what should be taught
came remarkably close to the [Boston Unitarian] conceptions of the day-a common
piety rooted in Scripture, a common civility revolving around the history and the state
documents of a Christian Republic, and a common intellectual culture conveyed via
reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, English grammar, geography, singing, and
some health education. ' 5 2 While some argued that this vision indeed included a
particular brand of Christianity, the differences among competing Protestant ap-
proaches were ultimately resolved in favor of attitudes similar to Mann's by the need
to develop a pattern to which increasing numbers of immigrants would be expected
to conform. 53
The Catholic minority, however, many of whom were new immigrants, rejected
the dominant pattern in favor of education founded in their own distinctive religious
tradition. The Pierce case finally validated the right of Catholic and other parents to
satisfy the compulsory school laws with their own schools, although the Establish-
ment Clause cases dealing with aid to parochial schools eventually limited the
practical significance of the private alternative by severely restricting access to public
funds. The Protestant/Catholic conflict, historically recast in rough terms into a
public school/private school conflict, nonetheless remains as an important counter-
theme in the march of universal education toward national uniformity. This strand of
history also verifies the continuing theoretical validity of the private, family-centered
heritage of today's commitment to public education, which helps to distinguish
schools from other agencies of government.
50. "Whereas . ..even under the best forms [of government], those entrusted with power have .. .perverted
it into tyranny; ... the most effectual means of preventing this would be, to illuminate . the minds of the people
. .." T. Jefferson, Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779), quoted in BRANN, supra note 20, at
40-41.
51. See BRUBACIER, supra note 28, at 551-60.
52. Cmuu, supra note 49, at 140.
53. See Gu n, "Molding" Citizens, in DEMlocRAcY AND E REriEwAL OF PuBUC EDuCATION 47 (R. Neuhaus ed. 1987).
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Inspired by John Dewey and other American pragmatists, the public school
movement further expanded its educational vision with the rise of progressive
education near the turn of the century. The schools developed a broadened sense of
social responsibility during the same years in which industrialization, urbanization,
and immigration were sowing the seeds of an increasing cultural diversity. In part as
a response to the social problems brought on by massive industrialization and the
challenges of life in the burgeoning cities, the schools of the progressive era were
increasingly seen as a source of "social and political regeneration." 54 As a result, the
educational emphasis in the schools shifted from traditional intellectual goals toward
social adjustment for students in the larger name of social utility. The schools also
enrolled more students and kept them longer, as secondary schooling became
increasingly universal and the compulsory age limit rose.
The American juvenile court movement also emerged contemporaneously with
and shared many assumptions of progressive education. The schools, the juvenile
courts, and voluntary child welfare agencies of this "child saver" era55 all reasoned
from the premises of parens patriae, which regarded state agents and child care
professionals as necessary supervisors in ensuring the training and control of
children. These agencies were widely supported, reflecting a strong national
commitment to child welfare. They were also characteristically operated on the basis
of paternalistic discretion, exercised by relatively authoritarian father figures,
symbolized by the school principal and the juvenile judge. At the same time, the
progressive era's brand of authority in the schools and elsewhere reflected greater
benevolence and flexibility than the more rigid attitudes of 19th century disciplinar-
ians.5 6
While the progressive child-oriented agencies acknowledged the primary role of
the family, some cultural historians argue that "the belief that the family no longer
provided for its needs justified the expansion of the school and of social welfare
services. ' 57 Indeed, some saw compulsory school laws as important protection from
parental exploitation of child labor.5 8 The attitudes and practices of the progressive
era did allow schools and other state agencies enough discretionary authority to
appropriate parental functions to themselves in ways that extended beyond the
assumptions on which the public schools were originally founded. The broad
discretion these agencies enjoyed inevitably led to some abuses. It is also apparent
that social and economic conditions changed toward mid-century faster than the child
saving organizations could adapt. But, as discussed shortly, the attempts of the 1960s
and 1970s toward the reform of paternalistic institutions were motivated less by
54. RAvrrcH, supra note 44, at 45 (quoting L. Cme.IIN, THE TRANSFORmATON OF mE ScuooL: PRorEssivist IN AmFUIAEN
EDucATIoN 1876-1957 (1961)).
55. See ZmEIan, supra note 19, at 30-48.
56. Teachers trained in progressive ideology "learned of the epochal struggle between the old-fashioned,
subject-centered, rigid, authoritarian, traditional school and the modem, child-centered, flexible, democratic, progressive
schools." RAvrrom, supra note 44, at 44.
57. C. LAscH, HAVEN IN A HRAn.tEss WoRm 14 (1977).
58. Id.
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systematic evidence of actual abuse than by a profound change in overall social
attitudes that shattered public confidence in authoritarian institutions.
The philosophy of progressive education dominated the public schools through-
out the first half of the twentieth century, establishing the appearance of both
uniformity and conformity, and creating an illusion of confidence that the schools
were capable of solving far more than educational problems. As criticism of
progressive education increased, however, there was ample basis for concluding that
these appearances were at best unrealistic, if not misguided. Ironically, our
educational histories recorded the demise of public confidence in the progressive
movement in the mid-1950s, just when our legal histories recorded the emergence of
school desegregation-the heaviest social burden the public schools had yet been
asked to bear. Simultaneously, our political history recorded the Soviets' launching
of Sputnik-a symbol of international competitiveness-as a crucial standard for
measuring educational quality. Our confidence in what had become an established
pattern was waning at the same time as our need for strong institutions was
increasing.
B. The Rejection of Paternalism: The Reform Era of the 1960s and 1970s
A thorough commentary on this important period in our social and political
history is beyond the scope of the present treatment. In general during these years,
from a multitude of causes, "[a]ll the institutions traditionally relied on for
socializing the young and directing human behavior to the achievement of social
purposes ... sustained massive losses of confidence and corresponding erosions of
morale. ' '59 Of particular significance for our interest in legal and educational
processes were the reform era's influence on authority patterns in schools and the use
of courts for group litigation and bureaucratic reform that included an interest in
constitutional rights for children.
1. Structural Reform
When Brown v. Board of Education introduced school desegregation into
American society, the Warren Court also introduced a fundamental re-thinking of the
relationship between the judiciary and all bureaucratic organizations, because
"desegregation was a total transformational process in which the judge undertook the
reconstruction of an ongoing social institution. "60 As other large agencies gradually
came under similar judicial scrutiny, the concept of "structural reform" emerged-
a new group litigation process built on the assumption that state bureaucracies
inherently constitute an ongoing threat to the general constitutional values of equality
and individual liberty. In the vision of structural reform, threats to civil liberties were
seen not only as discrimination against minority groups; rather, "the victim of these
59. F. ALLEN. THE DEcuNE OF TrE REHABIUTATIVE D A. 19 (198 1). For some general accounts, see BLooM, supra note
17; S. TwroN. G NG SA ,ED FRoM THE eSL-nEs (1982); Vtos'r, supra note 15; W. O'NruL, Co.uao APART: AN INFORMAL
HLsTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960's (1971).
60. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. I, 3 (1979).
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organizations is the citizenry itself."'6 1 Moreover, "[a]t the core of structural reform
is the judge,' '62 who focuses not on particular "incidents of wrongdoing," but on "a
social condition" and "on the bureaucratic dynamics that produce that condition." 63
By this means, judges "restructure the organization" 64 through broad supervision,
not because judges necessarily possess superior management expertise, but because
they "articulate and elaborate the meaning of our constitutional values." 65
Structural reform is both a general pattern and a specific analytical tool. As a
general pattern, this concept of adjudication captures the cumulative effects of
constitutional litigation as a principal means by which many aggrieved groups
challenged the prevailing institutional structures of American society (including
public schools) in the quarter century following Brown. As a tool of constitutional
analysis, structural reform (in part because of the effect of constitutional tests in civil
liberties cases) shifts the presumption of political legitimacy away from institutional
authority and toward judicial authority. This approach materially aided the process of
desegregation; however, its more general application to public schools challenged the
very idea of compulsory education, because structural reform begins from the
premise that the heirarchical structure on which traditional teaching methods are
based is illegitimate. 66
The expansion of social and welfare services in the 1960s also created incentives
for procedural challenges to governmental actions that affected the availability of
benefits-including educational benefits. Reformers pressed the courts to expand
civil due process guarantees both to curb "governmental arbitrariness in
decisionmaking" and to erect "sufficient procedural hurdles . . . that the costs of
governmental action would be so high that the government would refrain from taking
away some benefit it had granted... -67 As the courts responded, the scope of
administrative discretion in many agencies correspondingly contracted.
The idea of discouraging the removal of government benefits was less
productive in education than it might have been with financial entitlements, however,
because education cannot be "granted" in a material sense, even if physical
attendance improves. Reducing the discretion of school personnel reduces, to some
extent, their incentive as well as their capacity to provide meaningful instruction. For
this and other reasons, although far more minority students were enrolled in school
in 1980 than in 1950, educational quality for these same students deteriorated
drastically. 68
61. Id. at8.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 22.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 57.
66. A study of recent American educational history described the general effect of this pattern: "Programs,
regulations, and court orders began to reflect the strong suspicion that those in control of American institutions were not
to be trusted with any discretion where minorities, women, and other aggrieved groups were concerned." RAvrreH, supra
note 44, at 271.
67. R. MNOOKIN, R. BURT, D. CHAMBERS, M. WALL, S. SUUAMAN, F. ZimRtNo, R. SOLO.%ION, IN THE INmEREsT OF
CmLDR.N: ADVOCACY, LAw RE ORm, ANO PUsUC PoucY 471-72 (1985). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
68. See C. MURRAY, LosiNG GROUND 102-05 (1984). See also infra note 92.
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2. The Revolution and Education
The experience of the 1960s and 70s shook the very foundations of American
education, most visibly on college campuses. There was a special kind of irony in
higher education's becoming a target for student protest, because the "youthful
revolutionaries... tried to destroy the one institution in American society that
provided a sanctuary for their views. "69 Oddly, general student attitudes at Berkeley
only weeks prior to the "Free Speech Movement" reflected a high level of
satisfaction with the university experience. 70 Nevertheless, the spirit of protest
quickly swept across the most prestigious campuses, at times challenging the
university as a surrogate for white, corporate, and corrupt society.
The objectives announced by leaders of the student revolts were very general.
Tom Hayden, for example, asked "not to reform the university but to transform it
into a new institution, 'standing against the mainstream of American society."' 7'
Particular administrative acts or policies on a given campus were thus selected
according to their usefulness in serving the more fundamental purpose of challenging
the overall authority structure. As was said at Berkeley, "the issue is not the
issue.''72 In this way the process of civil disobedience became an end in itself,
providing opportunities for relevant social and political action as a way of life.
The student movement was also accelerated by events and pulsations in public
attitude that were not directly related to the movement's goals. A series of tragic
events occured, for example, including the assassinations of Martin Luther King and
Robert Kennedy, and finally the killing of six students at Kent State and Jackson
State. Much of the reform era's momentum was also fueled by intense, publicly
demonstrated reactions against the federal government's conduct of the war in
Vietnam. Variations and multiples among tangled political and social motivations
coalesced for some to justify a rejection of not only traditional governmental patterns,
but the entire value structure of the prevailing "Corporate State.' 73 At the same time,
the movement's links with more mainstream causes such as racial equality and
opposition to Vietnam "kept the student movement, sometimes in spite of itself,
close to the center of [publicly supported] political activity." 7 4
While the effects on public schools were less visible, they were in many ways
no less profound. The radical critique shook public confidence in the schools and in
traditional teaching methods by portraying the schools as enemies of true learning and
instrumentalities of social control. 75 As the spirit of personal liberation also emerged
69. RAvrrea, supra note 44, at 183.
70. In the fall of 1964, 82% of the students reported they were "satisfied or very satisfied" with their classroom
experience and 92% believed the university administration was "really trying very hard to provide top quality educational
experience for students here." Id. at 196.
71. Id. at 205. Some revolutionaries targeted universities not so much because they were repressive, but because
they were thought to represent centers of influence in which to train elite student populations for revolt against society.
In that sense, these leaders reflected their own belief in the power of education. See VioPmsr, supra note 15, at 163-96.
72. RAvnrc, supra note 44, at 223.
73. See generally C. Rucu, THE GRrruso oF AsiricA (1970).
74. "The sympathy enjoyed by the students created an illusion, which was long in dying, that young people could
rebel against the inherited structure of society-with widespread parental approval." ViogsT, supra note 15, at 165.
75. See Rmcn, supra note 73, and ALLEN, supra note 59, at 22-23.
19871
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
among the large scale social and political issues, "the counterculture posed a
challenge to any institution attempting to assert authority over young adults, even
teenagers. With its contempt for rationality and its reverence for immediacy, the
counterculture openly opposed the self-discipline, order, and respect for reason that
educational institutions rely on.' 76 The empirical studies of Gerald Grant and David
Riesman found that the most widespread and significant impact of the educational
upheaval was expanded student autonomy, which led to broad reductions in
traditional academic and behavioral expectations. 77 The elimination of many fixed
academic requirements led high schools to lower their general education and
graduation requirements, because many believed there was little reason to maintain
standards that were not required for university admission. 78
The developments of the revolutionary era also affected overall approaches to
learning in elementary and secondary schools. Although the Russians' launching of
Sputnik in 1957 had spurred reforms of progressive education with the aim of greater
scientific rigor, the needs of poor and minority students assumed ultimate priority in
the early 1960s. Then, when the early programs designed to help disadvantaged
students showed disappointing results and the mood of the times led to a rejection of
traditional approaches of all kinds, the stage was set for a series of innovative
experimental programs that opposed any form of authoritarian education.
One of the best known examples of the educational protest literature was A.S.
Neill's Summerhill, which challenged the discipline of traditional schools with the
argument that a child is "innately wise and realistic. If left to himself without adult
suggestion of any kind, he will develop as far as he is capable of developing.', 79 The
"open education" and "free schools" inspired by such assumptions sparked
educational movements that linked attitudes toward teaching and learning with the
general rejection of adult authority. Such innovations were adopted in various ways
in the schools, in part as a step toward greater social relevance, but also in the hope
of raising student interest as a way to cope with increasing behavioral problems. The
open emphasis also appealed to younger teachers, who themselves had been the
college students of the 1960s. At the same time, the loosening of traditional authority
contributed toward the erosion of public confidence in the schools, aggravating the
perception that lack of discipline was a major problem.80
3. The Children's Rights Movement
The original civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s did not regard the
nation's children as a disadvantaged minority group. On the contrary, children had
long enjoyed the privileges of specialized classification reflected in a widespread and
expensive system of schools, a juvenile court system, and other forms of both
76. RAvrrcH, supra note 44, at 200.
77. G. GRANT AND D. R Esm., THE PEauUAL Da. : REmRm A ExPumENr IN THE AzMERCAN COLLEGE 188-89 (1978).
See generally A. CHAsE, GROUP M MORY: A GUIDE TO COLLEGE AND STUoDEr SURVIvAL. IN THE 1980s (1980).
78. RAvn'cH, supra note 44, at 225.
79. A.S. NEI., SUMMERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO CHILD REARING 4 (1960).
80. See RAvrrcH, supra note 44, at 228-66.
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protection and affirmative assistance. Civil rights workers soon saw, however, that
the natural dependency of children compounded the harms inflicted on their parents
by poverty and discrimination. The need for improved services for minority group
children eventually became a focal point in attempts to reform both laws and social
institutions. Because of their inherent vulnerability to abuses of authoritarian
discretion, children also became identified with institutionalized or otherwise
dependent persons whose needs brought them within the reformers' scrutiny.
In addition, some writers argued that the legal concept of minority status was
itself a source of harmful discrimination-not because of particular evidence of harm
or even the possibility of demonstrable new benefits, but because the very idea of
"repressive" laws based on the arbitrary fact of age was repugnant to the free spirit
of the day.8 1 The advocates of this view included some who were leaders in the open
school movement.8 2
The courts and other agencies responded to child advocacy claims by giving new
attention to the basic needs of children-particularly those from disadvantaged
classes. New procedural standards were adopted for the guidance of juvenile courts
and public schools, clarifying the terms on which the state could intrude into the
parent-child relationship or could regulate the behavior of young people. The voting
age was lowered from twenty-one to eighteen and the rights of children began being
described in constitutional terms.
Although the rhetoric of full blown children's liberation was seldom accepted by
courts or legislatures, the children's rights decisions of the Supreme Court created a
basic (although, as the cases have developed, largely symbolic) shift in perceptions
about the relationship between children and governmental authority figures, including
public school personnel. The cases did not generally conclude that children should
determine their own choices; rather, they simply rejected the "child saver" era's
assumption that state agents in juvenile courts and public schools enjoy unrestricted
paternalistic discretion. Thus, having made the point that children do not shed their
rights at the schoolhouse gate or the courthouse door, the Supreme Court has been
very reluctant actually to interfere with the discretion needed by authorized providers
of child supervision. It has also stopped short of authorizing constitutional protection
for children's choice rights as distinguished from their rights to protection.83
81. For example, one advocate of liberating children from compulsory school laws and from legal restrictions on
voting, marrying, and contracting wrote:
In another sense, asking what is good for children is beside the point. We will grant children rights for the same
reason we grant rights to adults, not because we are sure that children will then become better people, but more
for ideological reasons, because we believe that expanding freedom as a way of life is worthwhile in itself.
If all this sounds too open and free, we must recognize that in this society . . . we are not likely to err in
the direction of too much freedom.
R. FAssos, BmTmrsGmrs 31, 153 (1974).
82. See, e.g., J. HOLT, Esc,,Es FRoM CnsnsooD (1974), which urges society to grant children "'the right to do, in
general, what any adult may legally do," including voting, having financial independence, choosing how one is educated,
and determining where one lives. Id. at 18-19. For references to additional literature see Hafen, supra note 16, at 630-32.
83. For more complete commentary on the children's rights cases, see infra section I.C.3.
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C. Critiquing the Reform Era
The accumulation of experience and evidence now allows consideration of some
effects, intended and unintended, of the reform era. The scope of this Article does not
call for a comprehensive review of that evidence, but, in general, most students of the
period conclude that the "revolution" created a vacuum by removing many
traditional standards and patterns without replacing them. Allan Bloom, for example,
regards the reforms as "without content." They were "the source of the collapse of
the entire American educational structure," but did not offer a new system. 84 With
respect to the problems of children and schools, a sample of available findings
generally shows that the costs associated with the reform era's reductions in
paternalistic discretion probably outweighs the benefits. Taken together, this accu-
mulation of evidence offers little support for educational or legal patterns rooted in
the working hypotheses of the 1960s.
1. Structural Reform, Child Advocacy Litigation, and Adolescent Behavior
Many characteristics of the group-oriented litigation model of structural reform
have become accepted procedure; however, its limitations have also been revealed in
evaluations pointing out its corrosive effects on judicial legitimacy, 85 the conflicts
created by advocates who are driven by broad ideological goals more than by the
immediate interests of class action clients, 86 and the resistance of the Burger Court to
broad doctrines of justiciability because of threats to the constitutional concepts of
federalism and separation of powers. 87 In addition, structural reform has come under
recent attack because it has not yielded the results it promised, because the judiciary
itself has become increasingly bureaucratized, and because of fears that the public
values adopted by the activist state of the 1960s are themselves a threat to privately
chosen ends. 88
Child advocacy litigation in the form of public interest class actions, introduced
by Brown v. Board of Education, was highly successful as measured by the
pro-plaintiff results it achieved in many cases. 89 However, a study of selected cases
84. "Without entering into the strictly political issues, the intellectual picture projected is precisely the opposite of
truth. The sixties were the period of dogmatic answers and trivial tracts. Not a single book of lasting importance was
produced in or around the movement. . . .Even the figures most seminal for 'the movement' like Marcuse, Arendt, and
Mills, did what serious work they did prior to 1960." BIoo.t, supra note 17, at 322. Similarly, Steven Tipton concluded
that the conflict between the traditional culture and the counterculture "left both sides of the battlefield strewn with
expired dreams and ideological wreckage. It resulted in the disillusioned withdrawal" of both sides. Twro, supra note
59, at 29. Accord Viopsr, supra note 15, at 548.
85. See, e.g., Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions,
65 VA. L. R v. 43 (1979); Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy., 91
YAt.e L.J. 635 (1982).
86. See, e.g., Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
87. See Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 Nons Dsul L. Rev. 862 (1985).
88. 0. Fiss, The New Procedure, address given at Brigham Young University (Jan. 17, 1986) (publication
forthcoming).
89. One study of 167 education cases, for example, found that the public interest party prevailed in 79% of the
cases. The cases dealt with a variety of education issues, including special education, financing policies, and free speech.
The variables most associated with successful outcomes were minority interests, the use of a formal advocacy organization
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found that "legal victories in children's cases, especially those securing procedural
safeguards, may have little real impact on children's welfare." Judicial supervision
of discretionary choices increases the formality or may alter location of choices
affecting children, but "because of the inherent subjectivity and indeterminacy
involved in such decisionmaking, regardless of who is the decisionmaker, these
adjustments may do little more than reshuffle the discretionary deck, without net
improvements in the policies or decisions affecting children.'"'9 Perhaps more
significantly, because children unavoidably lack the maturity to ensure the quality of
their own choices, reductions in the discretionary authority of custodial figures can
create a vacuum of support that has the effect of abandoning children to their
procedural rights. 9 1
In educational settings, such forms of abandonment were illustrated by declining
incentives for students to learn and for teachers to teach. Ironically, the students most
damaged by these effects are those most in need of educational assistance. 92
In other areas of adolescent behavior, recent data cast additional doubt on the
reformist assumption that extending increased legal liberties to young people would
benefit them more than harm them. In the early 1970s, for example, when 18 year
olds were being drafted for the war in Vietnam and were given the right to vote by
the twenty-sixth amendment, half of the states lowered the minimum drinking age
from 21 to 18 or 19. Between 1976 and 1983, however, about twenty states raised the
legal drinking age to its former level. In 1984, responding to new evidence
correlating high accidental death rates with age, Congress followed the strong
recommendation of a presidential commission on drunken driving by enacting
legislation that withholds federal highway funds from any state that fails to establish
a minimum drinking age of 21 by 1987. 93
Adolescent pregnancy is another area in which policies based on the assumption
that teenagers are capable of mature decisionmaking are coming under increased
scrutiny. While the complexities of empirical research in this area make it difficult to
draw definitive conclusions from any particular study, new research shows that as
both the number and proportion of adolescent clients increase in federally funded
contraception clinics, teenage pregnancy and abortion rates increase rather than
decrease. Even though increased participation in the clinics is associated with lower
as counsel, and the use of class actions. Lee & Weisbrod, Public Interest Law Activities in Education, in PUBUC IwNTrMMs
Lw: AN Eco.omic ArND INsrmnoNAL. ANALYsis 322-23 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978).
90. Hafen, Exploring Test Cases in Child Advocacy, a review of IN mE Imvr OF CHm.DEN: ADvocAcY, LAW
RErop,, AND PUBuc Poucy (R. Mnookin ed. 1985), 100 HARv. L. REv. 435, 437 (1986).
91. See id.
92. Despite higher enrollments among minority students during the reform period, "more students seemed to learn
to read and write and calculate in 1960 than in 1970." MueerA, supra note 68, at 172. The causes for such change are
complex, but a review of empirical evidence related to changes in welfare policy and economic incentives found that "a
student who did not want to learn was much freer not to learn in 1970 than in 1960, and freer to disrupt the learning
process for others. Facing no credible sanctions for not learning and possessing no tangible incentives to learn, large
numbers of students did things they considered more fun and did not learn." Id. at 173-74.
93. Rewriting a Rite of Passage, TtIe, July 2, 1984, at 24. See generally MNLu.t DftrIo AGE LAws: AN
EvA.Ano-4 (H. Wechsler ed. 1980). Public ambivalence on the drinking-age issue is reflected in Michigan's experience
between 1971 and 1980, when "lawmakers and voters were required to decide about minimum drinking ages three times
in less than ten years, and to choose among three different minimum ages." ZLMRINr, supra note 19, at 3-4.
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birthrates, "the impact on the abortion and total pregnancy rates was exactly
opposite the stated intentions of the [federal] program." 94
2. Educational Attainment and School Authority Patterns
The impact of the reform era on educational attainment was especially
unsettling. Educational historian Diane Ravitch found that both the educators and the
federal supervisors who encouraged open-ended innovations so vigorously in the late
1960s and early 1970s oversimplified the problems they tried to solve. Some of the
advocates of open schools had relied upon reports of success in an apparently flexible
British program, the "structure" of which was widely misunderstood by its
American proponents. Moreover, federal policy makers who pushed hard for
innovative programs mistakenly believed "that a major cause of the schools' troubles
was their rigidity and traditionalism, and that federal dollars should be used to free
the schools from existing practices.' 95 In fact, however, experimental, open school
alternatives failed "not because of the backwardness or insincerity of local schools
officials" but because the practical implementation of the programs "laid bare the
contradictions and vacuousness inherent in much of the contemporary rhetoric of
educational reform.' '96
A possible relationship between reform era attitudes and declines in academic
achievement was suggested by the report in 1975 that Scholastic Aptitude Test scores
among high school seniors had fallen steadily since 1963. When this report was first
issued, some observers assumed that the drop in scores was caused by increasing
numbers of disadvantaged students who were taking the tests. Subsequent research
controlled for those variables, however, finding that test scores continued to fall after
1970, when demographic factors were held constant. 97 The ominous report in 1983
of the National Commission on Excellence in Education might also have been
discounted as having a partisan flavor, since the Commission was appointed by a
conservative Republican president. However, when the panel was created in 1981,
there were already more than twenty other prominent groups studying similar
problems and ultimately producing similar findings, all oriented toward documenting
and recouping the past generation's losses in academic achievement. 98
94. Weed, Curbing Births, Not Pregnancies, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1986, at 32, col. 5. See generally Olsen and
Weed, Effects of Family-Planning Programs for Teenagers on Adolescent Birth and Pregnancy Rates, 20 FAR. PEsP.153
(1987).
95. RAvrrcH, supra note 44, at 257.
96. Id. at 259.
97. Ravitch, supra note 10, at 184-85. Accord J. Coi.ssN, T. Honm, & S. Kn.Gos, HIGH SCHOOL Aamvsisr.
PuRuc, CATHouC, AND PRIvATE SCHoOLS COMPAR 188 (1982).
98. For a summary of these reports see id. at 185-88. The National Commission was alarmed at the "rising tide
of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people," because other nations "are matching and
surpassing our educational attainments." Reviewing the last generation, the Commission warned that, "WVe have even
squandered the gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge" to the point that we "have lost
sight of the basic purposes of schooling." A NATION AT RIsK, supra note 9, at 5. In its specific findings, the Commission
reported that SAT scores demonstrated "a virtually unbroken decline from 1963 to 1980. . . . Both the number and
proportion of students demonstrating superior achievement [on the same tests] have also dramatically declined." Id. at
8-9. It also found that the "extensive student choice" in the curriculum undermined a sense of educational purpose; that
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The reports of these groups, especially in their common recommendations for a
basic required curriculum, remain subject to the criticism that a standard set of
academic course work may not serve the widely diverse abilities and interests of all
students equally well. The paradox of a national commitment to both excellence and
equal opportunity is unlikely to be quickly resolved. At the same time, the
overwhelmingly negative results of an excessively permissive approach to education
during the reform era make it clear that, whatever the curricular offering for a
particular student, his or her educational needs were not well served by policies that
reduced the demands made of students. When "the guiding principle" was
essentially "to give students what they wanted" the results reported by the national
panels seemed inevitably to follow. 99
A Nation at Risk links the ability of public schools to respond to the
contemporary pressure for academic revitalization to the "crucial leadership role"
played by principals and superintendents.l°° It is ironic if school leaders are now held
responsible for recent declines in discipline and achievement, because the relaxation
of standards during the 1960s and 1970s was in response to overwhelming, even if
confusing, external pressures to accomodate the Zeitgeist. External forces will
continue to make multiple demands on local leaders, now that many policies are
centralized at the state level o1 and policies and funding for a variety of special
circumstance groups are determined at the federal level.10 2 Yet one of the key
casualties of the reform era may be its adverse impact on the capacity of school
administrators and faculty to exert meaningful authority. A determination to attack
institutional authority was an overriding and unifying focal point among many
reformers, and in that respect the movement accomplished in diverse ways-some of
them unintentional-much of what it set out to do.
It is of course very difficult to establish cause and effect relationships between
declines in school authority patterns and educational achievement. As with any
complex set of empirical variables, even the most thorough research can only
establish associational patterns. However, the relationships demonstrated in recent
studies allow some potentially significant inferences.
For example, educational researcher Gerald Grant found in his field studies that
the authority structure of the schools was diffused and decimated by developments of
the last twenty years. He also found that strong connections exist between a school's
leadership policies and its educational quality. In general, his research in high schools
demonstrated that "the new adversarial and legalistic character of urban public
schools" would be the most noticeable change "to an observer who had not visited
a public school since the mid-1960s." This overall pattern is "a shift of profound
demands in courses, homework, textbooks, and college prerequisites were not sufficiently demanding; that insufficient
time demands were made on students; and that teacher training programs lacked adequate rigor. Id. at 18. In a variety of
ways, including recommendations concerning high school graduation requirements, the Commission urged "higher
expectations, for academic performance and student conduct." Id. at 27.
99. Ravitch, supra note 10, at 190. See supra note 98.
100. A NATION; AT RISK, supra note 9, at 32.
101. For example, twenty-two states now choose textbooks on a statewide basis. Baer, American Public Education
and the Myth of Value Neutrality, in DEmOcRACy AND THE RuavAw. Or PuBuc EDUCATION 4 (R. Neuhaus ed. 1987).
102. See generally chapter 8, The New Politics of Education, in RAvrrcl, supra note 44, at 267-320.
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dimensions," as "adult authority is increasingly defined by what will stand up in
court. ' 1
0 3
Grant found that teachers and counselors have become consistently unwilling to
exert authority, in part because they fear litigation, but also because they "are no
longer sure that they know what is right, or if they do, that they have any right to
impose it."' 4 In significant part, this attitude is also influenced by the prevailing
assumption among school personnel that "children are adults capable of choosing
their morality as long as they do not commit crimes." 10 5 These assumptions about the
maturity of children are similar to the premises of the more extreme forms of the
children's rights movement and open schools. 106 The Supreme Court has been
unwilling to recognize such assumptions in cases involving "choice rights" rights for
children under the age of majority. 10 7
Perhaps the most significant large-scale empirical evidence about the relation-
ship between school authority and educational outcomes is found in the work of
James Coleman and his colleagues comparing public and private schools in 1982.10
This study is best known for its basic finding that students in private schools generally
perform better on standardized achievement tests by about two grade levels than do
students in public schools. However, Coleman's methodology and sampling tech-
niques also allow more precise inferences about factors relevant to whether authority
in public schools is correlated with student academic achievement. Coleman found
that demographic and other student background characteristics accounted for about
half the variance between public and private school students. The other half of the
variance was attributable to the effects of academic and discipline policies in the
schools. Significantly, authoritarian institutional policies in these areas correlated
with high academic achievement in public as well as private schools. 10 9
Specifically, Coleman reported that (1) school discipline policies, (2) homework
requirements, and (3) attendance requirements were the three primary variables
associated with academic achievement on reading, mathematics, and other standard-
ized tests. 10 The research also found that school disciplinary requirements are not
103. Grant, The Character of Education and the Education of Character, 18 AmaERcAN Eoucmo 41 (1982).
104. Id. at 143.
105. Id. at 146.
106. See supra section I.B.3.
107. See infra section I.C.3.
108. Coma, AN, supra note 97.
109. Professor Coleman has explained that, in order to respond to anticipated criticism that private school
achievement was higher because of student background characteristics rather than because of school policies, his research
team controlled for background variables. They also controlled for variables distinguishing public and private schools.
When we examined, wholly within the public sector, the performance of students similar to the average public
school sophomore, but with levels of homework and attendance attributable to school policy in . . .private
schools, and those levels of disciplinary climate and student behavior attributable to school policy in
the . . . private schools, the levels of achievement are approximately the same as those found in the Catholic
and other private sectors.
[Tihese attributes ...are in fact those which make a difference in achievement in all American high schools
no matter what sector they are in.
Coleman, Private Schools, Public Schools, and the Public Interest, THE PuB. Imry=r, Summer, 1981, 19, 25.
110. Variables in school policy that were not found to be consistently related to achievement, on the other hand,
included per pupil expenditures as a measure of resources, laboratories, libraries, recency of textbooks, and breadth of
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only stronger, but are perceived by students as being more fair in private schools.II'
In addition, reductions in school authority over the past several years have been most
damaging to the educational achievement of disadvantaged students, because "it is
they who are most likely to be exposed to an undisiciplined environment."" 2
These statistical correlations in the context of other reported research show that
"both academic and disciplinary demands in high school have slackened during the
1970s."' 1 3 The precise causal factors behind these changes are more difficult to
isolate, but one of the apparent causes is "a fundamental change in the relation of the
school to the student, which had been that of trustee for parental authority." Other
influences include broad social changes, federal policies that reduce school discre-
tion, and reduced parental interest in the education of their children. 14
Other research corroborates these findings. Professor Grant cites the longitudinal
studies of Michael Rutter, which show that shared perspectives among administra-
tors, teachers, and students about discipline in a school make major differences in the
school's ability to educate disadvantaged students."15 Grant's own research verified
this same correlation between leadership and educational outcomes, revealing that to
understand the educational climate of a school, one must "understand the relationship
between intellectual and moral climates on the one hand and the nature of authority
on the other." He found that the authority most likely to be associated with
productive educational outcomes is not "authoritarian" in the raw or rigid sense, but
is of a coordinating and vision-sharing kind that "assures the united action of a
multitude" in pursuit of a common educational mission. However, the absence of the
informal trust associated with such authority patterns remains as a primary legacy
from the complex influences of the reform era. In Grant's view, "where that trust
does not exist, I think we are headed for ever greater stress, instability, and perhaps
the eventual abandonment of the public schools." "1 6 Unless students submit to some
degree of authority, little significant learning can occur.'"7
course offerings. Cot.rv.tAs, supra note 97, at 186-87.
111. Coleman, supra note 109, at 22.
112. CoL.N,, supra note 97, at 190. See also note 92.
113. Id. at 188.
114. Coleman regards the "increased willingness of parents to relinquish authority over and responsibility for their
adolescent children" as the most significant long range concern. Id. at 189-90.
115. See M. Rtrrm, B. MAUGH , P. MoMniORE, & J. Ousro-;, Fi'rsEE TnousAND HouRs: SEco-sov SCooLs mAD THE
EFFEcrs o CHnmRIN (1979), cited in Grant, supra note 103.
116. Id. at 146. Other research showing compatible conclusions is summarized in C. MuRRAY, supra note 68, at
chapter 7, especially note 15, which summarizes the general pattern that "lack of resources and lack of pedagogical
knowledge have not been important explanatory variables" regarding educational outcomes; rather, such "fundamental
characteristics" as "strong leadership by the principal, high expectations of the students, an orderly environment, and
close, continuing evaluation of the students' progress" are more typically the key variables.
117. Philosopher Michael Polanyi has written that neither basic nor sophisticated skills can be learned without the
sense of trust inherent in personal master-apprentice relationships:
An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted by prescription, since no prescription for it
exists. It can be passed only by example from master to apprentice. . . .To learn by example is to submit to
authority. You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot account
in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example,
the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the
master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent
uncritically to the imitation of another. A society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must
submit to tradition.
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The foregoing summary of empirical evidence does not directly show that
expanded free expression rights for students are negatively correlated with academic
achievement. The more appropriate inference related to judicial supervision of
student expression is that court-imposed restraints on the exercise of discretion related
to educational matters by school officials are likely to reduce a school's general
exercise of authority. As identified in the reported research, this phenomenon occurs
as something of a "chilling effect" that inhibits the development of overall authority
patterns in the learning and disciplinary environment. In that sense, heightened
judicial scrutiny and the fear of litigation can adversely affect the implementation of
academic and disciplinary policies that are in fact related to achievement. When such
policies are not authoritatively maintained, a school is likely to be less productive in
fulfilling such first amendment values as developing students' understanding, powers
of expression, and intellectual autonomy.
3. The Children's Rights Cases
I have discussed elsewhere the historical justification for the concept of
children's legal status as minors and how the early children's rights cases appeared
to question that concept.' 18 1 have also summarized elsewhere the development of the
Supreme Court's more recent children's cases, finding that the Court's attitude
toward liberationist arguments in those cases has over time become much more
cautious than was discernible in its early bursts of interest in the novel idea of
constitutional rights for children. ",9
Taken together, the children's cases show that the Court has not significantly
altered the fundamental assumptions governing children's status as minors, nor has it
departed substantially from the idea that children lack the maturity necessary to
exercise constitutional rights involving free choice. Nearly all of the cases are
designed to protect children from procedural or other forms of abuse. These forms of
constitutional protection are not related to changed assumptions about children's
mature capacity; on the contrary, it is precisely because of children's dependency and
unique vulnerability that additional forms of protection have been developed. Thus,
the argument of open school advocates that children are "innately wise and realistic"
and are "capable of developing" without "adult suggestion of any kind"1 20 has not
been accepted by the Court. Moreover, the anti-authoritarianism that pervaded the
reform movement has influenced the Court only toward ensuring greater protection
for children against the abuses of utterly unchecked adult discretion. It has not
generally caused the Court to direct transfers of actual decisionmaking authority from
adults to children.
M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNowimrE: TowARDS A Posr-CRmcA.L Pnaosomy 53 (1964).
118. See Hafen, supra note 16, at 605.
119. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and
Social Interests, 81 Mic. L. REv. 463, 511-17 (1983).
120. Supra note 79.
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These observations are illustrated by briefly reviewing selected reform era
children's cases. Virtually all of these cases involve rights granted to protect minors,
not rights that guarantee minors' freedom to make their own decisions. The juvenile
court cases, for example,12 ' are built upon the premise that children's status as minors
does not by itself justify complete disregard for the standards of procedural due
process. While the development of this limitation on judicial discretion has altered
some juvenile court procedures and has led to recommendations for more clear-cut
standards designed to discourage state intervention in ongoing families and to
discourage punishment for non-criminal behavior, 2 2 the essentially paternalistic
character of the juvenile court remains. Indeed, subsequent to Gault the Court refused
to grant juveniles the right to a jury trial for reasons related to its commitment to the
"paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates." 123
Reform era cases also subjected school disciplinary procedures to due process
standards, but at a sui generis level so minimal that these cases stand primarily for the
Court's unwillingness to conclude that due process has no application at all to
schools. Goss v. Lopez first established in 1975 that students are entitled to
"rudimentary" procedural "precautions," holding that they may not be suspended
without "some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing." 124 The Court recognized
the unusual character of the school environment by leaving discretion with school
officials to define the level of formality required, reflecting its intent not to alter
fundamentally the paternalism inherent in school discipline. As noted in a thorough
study of Goss, "Principals are fathers, but failure to listen to the students' side of the
story is a species of child neglect." '12 And in recently accepting the concept that the
fourth amendment applies to searches in schools, the Court imposed neither a warrant
requirement nor a probable cause standard, preferring the less demanding test of
"reasonableness, under all the circumstances.' ' 126 The majority reaffirmed "the
comprehensive authority" of appropriate officials "to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools" and was "unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of
a search is dependent upon a judge's evaluation of the relative importance of various
school rules."' 127
Other cases establish a variety of constitutional protections for children that are
distinct from rights ensuring their autonomous personal choices. In free expression
cases outside the educational setting, for instance, the Court has primarily restricted
adult expression in order to protect children from indecent material that is not
"obscene" under adult standards.' 2 8 Moreover, adolescents' constitutionally pro-
121. This line of cases began with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
122. See B. FucKm, STANDARDS FOR Juvesne JusncE: A SusmoARY Amo ANALYsS (2d ed. 1982) (prepared for the
American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project).
123. McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
124. 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
125. MNooesw, supra note 67, at 486.
126. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
127. Id. at 342 and n.9.
128. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), involving the sale of soft-core pornographic
magazines; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), involving the use of vulgar language on public radio trans-
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tected access to contraceptives is based on their need for protection rather than a right
to choose to have sexual relations or to bear children. 129
The validity of the distinction between protection rights and choice rights is
further underscored by recalling that adolescents do not enjoy such fundamental
constitutional choice rights as voting, contracting, and marrying.130 Even the minors'
abortion cases, which do grant a right of choice to "mature" minors, are consistent
with the traditional theory underlying the concept of minority status, because the
choice right is conditioned on a judicial determination of maturity-a subjective
substitute for statutory age-based determinations of adult status. Moreover, the
plurality opinion in the most recent abortion case, Bellotti v. Baird,131 contains the
Court's most complete statement to date of the reasons why "the constitutional rights
of children cannot be equated with those of adults' '--the "peculiar vulnerability" of
children, their inability to "make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner,"
and the importance of the parental role, which supervises children's decision
making. 132
Experience since the Bellotti case with adolescent abortion also provides a
sobering demonstration of what happens to children when courts reduce the scope of
discretionary judgment exercised by authority figures to the point that children are
deprived of an affirmative source of needed support and guidance. 133
Judicial intervention designed to guard against harmful decisions by school
officials is a different matter from judicial intervention designed to sustain free
choices by students. Arguments intended to protect against abuses of discretion do
not necessarily establish a basis for allowing student choice, especially in cases
involving immature children who may require protection against the consequences of
their own poor choices as much as they require protection against administrative
compulsion. This distinction is a potential flaw in the arguments of those who
missions; and New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), involving the use of material showing children engaged
in sexual conduct.
129. The plurality opinion in Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), granted minors the right to
prevent conception in the name of their right of privacy, but the justices' primary concern was clearly their fear that
without access to contraception, sexually active teenagers would be left unprotected against the serious risks of venereal
disease and pregnancy. "The sexually active 15-year-old is given access to birth control not out of recognition of his or
her mature judgment. Indeed, the less equipped a particular individual is for the burdens of parenthood, the stronger the
argument against denying access to contraception when we cannot deny access to sex .... The civil right being
vindicated is the right not to be gratuitously harmed." Z muo, supra note 19, at 63.
130. The Second Circuit recently held that requiring parental consent as a condition of issuing a marriage license to
adolescents below a specified age does not violate their constitutional rights of privacy or freedom to marry. Moe v.
Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982).
131. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 634.
133. The plurality opinion in Beltoni provided that a pregnant adolescent is entitled to ajudicial hearing to determine
whether she is sufficiently mature to make her own decision about an abortion. If she is found not to be mature, the judge
determines whether an abortion would be in her best interests. Research conducted in a two-year period following this
decision found that of 1,300 pregnant minors who sought judicial authorization for abortions without parental consent, all
eventually obtained an abortion. MNooess, supra note 67, at 239. The shift from parental discretion to judicial discretion
in these cases seems to mean little discretion at all, because judges have been unwilling to substitute their personal
judgment for the preference of an expectant teenager, regardless of her age or psychological maturity. This result follows
not necessarily from a belief that minors should be liberated from their restricted status, but more likely from skepticism
about paternalistic authority-in families or in a judge's chambers-combined with an awkward, subjective constitutional
concept.
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evidently assume that the need to discourage official indoctrination necessarily
implies an occasion for student choice. 134 It should discourage the illogical leap from
protection against abuse to assurance of autonomous choice to know that the Supreme
Court has sought to protect children against their vulnerability but has not sought to
authorize their choices.
4. Tinker and Fraser in Historical Perspective
Free expression for children, a particular focus of this Article, remains as a
unique category of constitutional rights for minors, probably located closer to
protection rights than to choice rights. 35 Leaving until Section II.C. a more complete
treatment of general first amendment values in the school context and leaving until
Section III.C. the specific issues relating to student newspapers, this section on
context next places Tinker and Fraser in historical perspective. 136
The turbulence of the late 1960s virtually demanded an affirmative answer to the
question whether students have any expression rights at all. For the Court to have
answered negatively would have aggravated mounting national frustrations that
moved students to express their grievances. A negative answer would also have
required the Court to overlook several key elements in the facts of Tinker that made
it a nearly ideal case in which to recognize that student expression should at some
point outweigh the general interest in the institutional autonomy of public schools.
The students wore black armbands in a peaceful protest against the government's
conduct of the war in Vietnam, the most important public issue of the day. This
participation in democratic political expression claimed the highest form of traditional
first amendment protection. They expressed their views in restrained silence akin to
"personal intercommunication," removed from any connections with the curricu-
lum, extracurricular activity, or other appearance of official acquiescence.
Moreover, it was clear by the 1960s that the progressive education of the
child-saver era had indulged state agents in such an expansive paternal role that the
place of parents was at times being displaced. Given the original link between public
schools and parental interests, there were reasons to be concerned about those
excesses, and there were reasons to encourage closer ties between schools and
parents. The children in Tinker wore their armbands as the result of encouragement
by their parents, who were also wearing armbands the same day as part of a common
family plan. 137 For schools to accomodate parental interests in this non-disruptive and
principled participation in the education of their children also hearkened back to a
high tradition in public education. Thus, student expression under these facts was
held protected by the first amendment unless school officials could reasonably
forecast a material disruption.
134. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
135. As shown in section nI.C., Tinker can be understood as a freedom of the mind case having a relatively narrow
scope that does not depend upon maturity. In that sense, it is a protection case more than a choice case.
136. For additional discussion of the Fraser case, see infra text accompanying notes 289-94.
137. See 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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Fraser, on the other hand, called for a nearly opposite response, as indicated by
the agreement among eight members of the Court that a vulgar speech in a student
assembly was not protected expression. 38 The speech involved indecent language,
which moved it toward the unprotected side of the speech continuum. It was also
delivered at an officially sponsored school event, even though outside the formal
curricular offerings. There was parental involvement in bringing suit against the
school district, but no indication that the content of the speech pursued a parent's
educational objective. The record also showed there was no material disruption,
which suggests that the Fraser Court made its decision on grounds other than the
Tinker standard.
The Fraser case also arose in a much altered historical setting. Just as the 1960s
asked for reassurance that students are people too, the early 1980s asked for
reassurance that schools should be more seriously devoted to meaningful education.
As described earlier, the schools steadily lost academic quality, authority, morale,
and public confidence in the generation between Tinker and Fraser.13 9 The Supreme
Court, in one of its most stirring moments, had already stated its belief that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments;" 40 therefore, it was of no trivial consequence that in the same month when
Matthew Fraser gave his speech to the studentbody at Bethel High School, 141 the
National Commission on Excellence in Education released "an open letter to the
American people" declaring that "the educational foundations of our society are
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as
a Nation and a people." 142
One other important element about the contrast between Tinker and Fraser is
that both lower federal courts in Fraser missed seeing that the differences between the
two cases called for a different standard. Reflecting a perspective on student speech
cases that typified the understanding of many other lower courts (and of Justice
Marshall's dissent), both the district court and the Ninth Circuit looked primarily for
evidence of substantial disruption or obvious harm. This view of Tinker holds that a
school's attempt to limit any student expression is presumptively chilling, and in the
absence of a reasonable basis for forecasting serious disruption or tangible harm to
others, any doubts of either fact or law should be resolved against administrative or
faculty authority. If schools were adult public forums, that would be classic first
amendment theory. But, as Justice Stewart noted in the Court's first free speech case
involving minors, "a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 143 And as the
Supreme Court could perhaps see in developing a historical perspective about the
138. Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented, but Justice Stevens agreed with the school's right to regulate the
speech. He objected only to punishment in the absence of a reliable warning to the student that his speech might violate
a school rule. 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3171 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See supra section I.C.2.
140. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
141. April, 1983.
142. A NAoN AT Rism, supra note 9, at 5.
143. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)(Stewart, J., concurring).
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implications of ruling for the student in Fraser, twenty years of treating schools as if
they were adult public forums had undermined what could be the most fundamental
interest young people have in the values of the first amendment-the right to receive
a serious education. That right had not been expressed in Tinker, because it was too
obvious in 1969. But by 1986, too many judges, like too many other Americans,
perhaps had "lost sight of the basic purposes of schooling."'-
D. The Contemporary Ambivalence
Many results of the reform era are now fixed characteristics of the public
schools, so that numerous basic conflicts will remain indefinitely. Desegregation in
the schools has made a monumental contribution toward other forms of social,
political, and economic desegregation, thus aiding a larger healing of wounds in a
society that carried for too long the pain of racism. Our school populations are likely
to remain pluralistic and heterogeneous. The momentum of mainstreaming other
children once excluded from the benefits of public education also carries the promise
of long term benefits. The rights of students, faculty, and others who experience
serious maltreatment are also more clearly assured as a result of demystifying a wide
variety of administrative procedures.
At the same time, despite new calls for qualitative reform, it is far from clear that
we can "democratize the academic curriculum ... without cheapening it." 145 Nor
have we found a satisfactory means to limit the potential for authoritarian abuse
without also undermining the sense of involvement, commitment, and responsibility
administrators and teachers must sense in order to be educationally productive with
their students. A balance between these competing interests is essential in public
education, because the schools are among the few established structures that
affirmatively nurture the wellsprings of individual liberty over the long term.
Yet our attempts to transfer civil liberties doctrines from the adult contexts in
which they originated to schools involving children have confused our understanding
of the very nature of public schools. This ambivalence is nicely captured by the
contradictions regarding the idea of in loco parentis in two of the Supreme Court's
most recent school cases. In holding that school personnel are "state agents" for
fourth amendment purposes when they conduct searches in connection with disci-
plinary functions, the Court said "school officials act as representatives of the State,
not merely as surrogates for the parents." 146 But only the next year, the Fraser Court
said its past cases "recognize the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school
authorities acting in loco parentis to protect children-especially in a captive
audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." 147
144. A NATnON ATRisK, supra note 9, at 5.
145. Ravitch, supra note 10, at 193.
146. New Jersey v.T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 336 (1985). "'[T]he concept of parental delegation' as a source of school
authority is not entirely 'consonant with compulsory education laws.' Today's public school officials do not merely
exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated
educational and disciplinary policies." Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)) (citation omitted).
147. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986). This language echoes Justice Brennan's
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This apparent inconsistency is not necessarily an unwitting contradiction. Both
expressions carry seeds of truth. School officials are state agents for many purposes,
but the same cases establishing this role in disciplinary functions have created
standards of constitutional procedure that are unique to the school setting. In that
sense, school personnel are not treated the same as other state agents, nor does
procedural due process have the same meaning in school cases that it does
elsewhere. 148
At the same time, teachers and administrators acting in daily roles of temporary
but de facto child custody literally are standing in the place of parents for many
custodial purposes, just as juvenile courts may appoint welfare workers to act on
behalf of children when a competent parent is absent. These factors illuminate both
the dual heritage 149 and the sui generis nature of the public school as a legal entity.
Rather than lurching back and forth between public or judicial moods, we need a
constitutional concept that captures both the paradox and the uniqueness of the public
school, allowing teachers and administrators to be both state agents and in loco
parentis. Though not yet an established legal construct, an appropriate model to aid
our thinking toward this end might be that of the mediating institution. 150
We are also becoming ambivalent about the nature of children. The excesses of
our flirtation with children's liberation have created a lingering sense of uncertainty
whether children really do lack the necessary maturity to be treated as adults. Marie
Winn's Children Without Childhood,15 1 for example, describes "a profound alter-
ation in society's attitude toward children,"' 5 2 tracing the connections among a
general erosion of institutional authority, the instability of marriage, the sexual
revolution, and "the crucial [but unjustified] assumption: that children have the same
capacity as adults to assimilate and utilize knowledge and experience."' 153 Recent
research about the effects of television also suggests that TV's careful attempts to
appeal to mass audiences erases the traditional distinctions between adults and
children, with adverse effects on the normal psychic maturation of children.154
Such uncertainty is aggravated by the conflict of interest adults experience in
thinking about legal rights for children. When school personnel or parents liberate
their children from watchful supervision, they also liberate themselves from some of
the arduous self-sacrifice that has traditionally been required of those devoted to the
earlier statement that a "legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibilty." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
148. Nevertheless, the traditional weight of constitutional presumptions may make this primarily a rhetorical point.
In deciding that the fourth amendment does apply to school searches, the Court stated that "the courts should, as a general
matter, defer to [the] judgment [of school administrators]" on the legitimacy of existing disciplinary rules-unless it is
"suggested" that "the rule violates some substantive constitutional guarantee." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
343 n.9 (1985). It is easy enough for modem advocates to allege constitutional violations that this posture is not as
deferential toward school discretion as it may appear. Still, there is tangible acknowledgement of the paternalistic nature
of a school in the Court's unwillingness to impose standard probable cause and a warrant requirement on schools. See id.
149. See supra section I.A.
150. See infra section II.B.
151. M. WVrn, CHnaanEN Wmiour CHILDHOOD (1981).
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. at 197.
154. See N. PonMaN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF HILDHOOD (1982).
[Vol. 48:663
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS MEDIATING STRUCTURES
serious nurturing of children. It is a tantalizing but deceptive thought that we serve
the interests of our children by simply deferring to their preferences, because serving
their interests in that way also serves the personal interests of adults who are incon-
venienced by the needs and demands of children. The concern of the 1960s and 1970s
with the excessive paternalism of the progressive era was not without foundation, but
the children in our schools need more than the vacuum created by reducing paternalistic
discretion and not putting some form of meaningful support in its place.
It may help our perceptions of this problem to recall Justice Powell's insight that:
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with
our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of
the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may
be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.1 55
Public schools as mediating institutions for children might, consistent with this
vision, stand between the tradition of parental authority and the tradition of individual
liberty.
II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS THAT SUSTAIN FIRST
AMENDMENT VALUES
Part I suggests that students in the public schools may have experienced the
excesses of oversupervision during the progressive era and the excesses of
undersupervision during the reform era of the 1960s and 1970s. Being aware of risks
at the extreme edges of the continuum between liberty and order, 156 we need legal
concepts that maintain a productive and continuing balance between individual and
social interests. That need is especially relevant in our attitudes toward young people,
because the choice is not simply between viewing them as totally dependent or totally
independent. Professor Franklin Zimring has argued persuasively that "the theory
that those who are not totally independent should be regarded as totally dependent is
the most troublesome aspect of the legal theory of early adolescence associated with
juvenile courts, public schools, and social services for most of this century." 157 The
most troublesome aspect of more recent theories is the simple reversal that causes
some to regard young students as totally independent.
Children are not the victims of permanent restrictions on their autonomy. If the
restrictions are wisely applied, they both learn from them and quickly outgrow them.
155. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
156. John Stuart Mill, known for his advocacy of unrestrained liberty, recognized the risks of excess at either
extreme. He wrote that "[in some early states of society," the forces of individual autonomy were "too much ahead of
the power which society then possessed of disciplining" them. Those were times "when the element of spontaneity and
individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it." when Mill wrote these lines in 1859,
it seemed to him that "society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature
is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences."J. MiLL, ON LiBEriy 73-74 (Liberal Arts Press
ed. 1956). From this perspective, the revolutionary stirrings of the 1960s may have been a reaction against too much social
conformity, just as today's need for reassertion of "the social principle" is perhaps an understandable reaction against a
quarter century of witnessing the excesses of "personal impulses and preferences."
157. ZmRwo, supra note 19, at 27-28.
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As for self-expression, "[t]o every thing there is a season, and a time to every
purpose under the heaven: ... a time to keep silence, and a time to speak." 58 The
older children become, the greater their need to move from a time of silence to a time
to speak. We might productively view adolescence as the learning years, a time when
young people should be heard as well as seen, for these are years of expanding
horizons. By seeing the consequences of writing or speaking their minds, they will
learn from experience in what is usually a low risk way. 159 As children grow, they
must develop the capacity to make decisions by making some. 160 Learning of that
kind requires customized mixes of autonomy and restraint, fashioned and guided
toward the end of maximizing personal maturation and skill development. 161
The process of guiding children through this stage is essentially a teaching
process. Such teaching, especially when done by public school faculty and admin-
istrators, is also mediational in nature: it mediates between the private world of the
home and the public world of society; between childhood and adulthood. Toward this
end, public schools are mediating institutions.
A. Mediating Institutions
A mediating institution is a conceptual rather than a technical, legal category of
analysis. Such institutions are the "little platoons," to use Edmund Burke's phrase,
that stand between the public and private spheres. 162 The personal, private sphere is
where "meaning, fulfillment, and personal identity are to be realized" for each
person. The public sphere, which can include the institutions of the national
economic marketplace as well as the institutions of government, is comprised of
"megastructures" that are "typically alienating ... [and] not helpful in providing
meaning and identity for individual existence."1 63 Standing between the individual
and the megastructures are such mediating structures as families, churches, neigh-
borhoods, schools, and voluntary associations. Some of these have been called "the
value-generating and value-maintaining agencies in society."164 Traditionally, these
have also been major sources of social continuity and stability, as well as a critical
source of protection against the development of totalitarian tendencies.' 65
158. Ecclesiastes 3:1,7.
159. "Expression is normally conceived as doing less injury to other social goals than action. It generally has less
immediate consequences, is less irremediable in its impact." T. Emmsoi, THE SYSTiss oF F E.oo.i or ExRasio- 9 (1970).
But see Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Trx. L. REv. 321 (1979).
160. "Being mature takes practice. To know this is to suppose . . . [one] justification for extending privileges in
public law and family life to those who have not yet reached full maturity." ZLMtIRN, supra note 19, at 89.
161. Zimring calls this a "learner's permit" stage of life, requiring more freedom than young children enjoy but
more restrictions than are placed on adults. See id.
162. See P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EiPowER PEoPLE: THE RoLE OF MEDIATMNG S-mucrums IN PuBuc Poucv (1977).
The significance of intermediate institutions in democratic political theory is developed in R. NisBEr, THE Qursr FoR
Cot.%uNrrY (1953). The American city as an intermediate structure is fully explored in Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
93 HAsv. L. REv. 1059 (1980), which also contains a brief summary of relevant literature in its note 1. For a discussion
of religious organizations as mediating institutions, see Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 1606, 1740-81 (1987).
163. BERoE & NEUAUS, supra note 162, at 2.
164. Id. at 6.
165. See NISBEr, supra note 162.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS MEDIATING STRUCTURES
This theme is the modem expression of a central thesis in Alexis deTocqueville's
classic study of American character and institutions of the early 1800s, Democracy in
America. Tocqueville feared that the strong individualistic strain in democracy could,
if unrestrained, tear apart the very connections that hold a free nation together. 166 For
him, our system's primary source of protection against this risk was the people's
interest in voluntary, intermediate associations, through which "the Americans
combat the effects of individualism by free institutions." 167 Tocqueville found that
"Americans ... are forever forming associations,"' 68 which included not only
spontaneous and cooperative approaches to local government or industry, but "the
intellectual and moral associations" he thought to be so important that
"nothing... more deserves attention." 1 69 Tocqueville took particular interest in
religion and family life. The "mores" formed in such places-these he called "the
habits of the heart"-were "one of the great general causes responsible for the
maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States,"1 70 because "[tihere have
never been free societies without mores."'71 The development of mores restrained
the destructive, acquisitive appetites of individualism and developed a sense of
personal and civic virtue. In Tocqueville's mind, these were the civilizing traditions
on which the long term future of the democratic experiment hinged. As we have seen,
Jefferson, Mann, and others believed the schools would play a key role in that same
process. 172
Some mediating structures are institutional, such as the nuclear family,
churches, and schools, while others are more loosely organized, such as neighbor-
hoods or kinship-based ethnic groups. 173 Institutions of the mediating kind are usually
private, voluntary organizations, but a few might technically belong to the govern-
mental sphere, such as schools and certain local governmental units, yet they still
serve both political and personal functions as mediating institutions. Of special
interest to the present discussion are the structures devoted to what Tocqueville called
"intellectual and moral" matters, because that is the core concern of the first
amendment. Schools can be seen to fit many contours of this model, because they are
engaged in intellectual processes that make a school a carrier of meaning. At the same
time, a public school does not transmit highly personal sources of value interpretation
in the same way as do families and churches.
Under our theory of government, the State is not the primary source of the
substantive values that give ultimate meaning to individual lives. Indeed, we
166. "[N]ot only does democracy make men forget their ancestors, but also clouds their view of their descendants
and isolates them from their contemporaries. Each man is forever thrown back on himself alone, and there is danger that
he may be shut up in the solitude of his own heart." A. DETocQuEvauL, DEmocRc'r m Asumu 508 (Mayer ed. 1966).
167. Id. at 509.
168. Id. at 513.
169. Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 287.
171. Id. at 590.
172. See supra section I.A.
173. I use the term "mediating institutions" to describe those having institutional character, while "mediating
structures" includes all groups or organizations performing ongoing mediating roles between the private and public
sectors.
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discourage the State from that role by such doctrines as separation of church and
state. The totalitarian state, by contrast, gladly and aggressively assumes the role of
imposing on all its citizens "one comprehensive order of meaning.' ' 74 The
guarantees of the Bill of Rights are primarily process-oriented values-liberty,
equality, due process, free speech-that define the terms on which the State must deal
with its citizens. At the same time, however, these processes consciously seek to
assure each individual citizen of the governmental protection and the freedom
necessary for his or her own pursuit of personal meaning and fulfillment. 175 These
procedural and structure-establishing values are an essential means toward the end of
personal self-determination. Schools help provide tools for this quest.
Individuals are not left totally to their own resources in the personal quest for
purpose. The right freely to pursue personal meaning is embodied primarily in the
values of the first amendment, which are usually regarded as a set of individual
liberties. Yet the tradition of the first amendment also recognizes and protects certain
intermediate structures-those "intellectual and moral associations'"-that are car-
riers of meaning and developers of the tools necessary to explore meaning. Thus, the
first amendment and related constitutional sources should protect not only individual
religious liberty, but the institutional liberty of churches; not only personal academic
freedom, but the institutional liberty of schools and colleges; 176 not only individual
freedom of speech, but the associational or institutional freedom of groups and
newspapers; not only the personal right to seek meaning and education, but the
institutional role of the family to direct the moral, intellectual, and spiritual
development of its children. The "little platoons" are a deliberate part of the
structure, for they nurture the values that ultimately sustain the entire system-as well
as sustaining the personal quest of each citizen.
For these reasons, our constitutional theory protects these institutions from
excessive governmental or other forms of harmful intrusion, except when the
institutions cause serious harm to the members of their groups or when there are
serious conflicts with overriding governmental policies. Thus, the interest of parents
in freely rearing their children is subject to such limitations as child abuse and
compulsory education laws. The interests of churches and educational institutions are
subject to various forms of government regulation, but only when the regulations
pose no material threat to the religious or academic mission of the institution. As an
institution's purpose moves further from the first amendment's special interests in the
intimacy of family and kinship or in political, religious, and intellectual freedom, its
protections are correspondingly reduced.
Because the developments of recent years have moved the schools away from a
family model and toward a more traditional state agency model, 177 a public school
today probably would not satisfy the criteria for associational or intimate relationships
174. BERR & NEsuAus, supra note 162, at 3.
175. "We live in a Republic that does not attempt to provide happiness but to facilitate its pursuit; hence, all its ways
are instrumental-our public realm is primarily one of means." BRANN, supra note 20, at 61.
176. See infra section II.B.
177. See supra section I.A.
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protected under the first amendment. 78 However, public schools come-and for
educational purposes should come-closer to fulfilling mediating and even as-
sociational functions than do other units of government. To be sure, a state-sponsored
school must respect the autonomy of each child's beliefs-in significant part because
the inculcation of personal beliefs is allocated to parents under democratic theory. 179
Yet the needs of children and the very nature of the educational process suggest that
schools need not be far removed from the institutions and associations that "have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs."1 80
The state must show unusually compelling reasons for intervening in these
highly protected relationships. The law is reluctant to allow legal claims against the
mediating institution arising from alleged harms to its own members. For example,
relationships involving familial intimacy are not supervised by the state, unless
serious abuse is inflicted or unless the relationship itself is threatened. This reticence
arises from the overriding commitment of constitutional theory to the value of
encouraging continuity and intimate interaction within the protected sphere, because
that continuity is essential for mediating institutions to perform their functions.
Educational functions are similarly dependent upon intimacy and continuity in
student-teacher relationships.
In recent years, however, the influence of most mediating structures has been
declining. Legal and social attitudes have come to reflect a strong individual rights
flavor, which looks with suspicion upon the institutional character of many mediating
structures. Federal regulation has also become increasingly intrusive toward local
organizations, in large measure motivated by understandable concerns about abuses
of discretionary power. Thus, the growing influence of regulation has dramatically
reduced the scope of discretionary activity, thereby reducing from the megastructure
side the autonomy and, hence, the influence of mediating institutions. Their influence
was simultaneously eroding on the private side through the fragmentation of shared
personal values and an emerging distrust of institutions in general. As the
megastructure of government has grown, fears of government's intrusive power were
somehow transferred into fears of all institutional power.
B. Public Schools as Mediating Institutions that Sustain First Amendment Values
As noted occasionally in the preceding Section, the traditional role and function
of the public school corresponds in many ways with the roles of other mediating
institutions that have their roots in the values and the protections of the first
amendment. The primary source of doubt whether a public school really stands
between the public and private sectors is that the school is itself a public institution,
despite its historical ties to the private sphere of family life. Moreover, as a public
institution, a school can be terminated by governmental action.
178. See Board of Directors, Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
179. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
180. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
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The family, on the other hand, "is the major institution within the private
sphere," 181 where it performs society's central mediating, value-generating function.
As part of their constitutionally protected role of value transmission, however,
parents have enjoyed the right (and the duty) to direct the education and rearing of
their children. Thus, the schools to which parents sent their children have for many
purposes stood in the place of the parents. 18 2 In this sense, both private and public
schools assumed a mediating role as extensions of the family. Over time, however,
affected by the consequences of school desegregation and other sources of increasing
cultural heterogeneity, the place of the public school has become less clear. 183 In fact,
public schools are not true extensions of the value-laden private sphere in the way a
private school or most other mediating institutions would be.
The development of establishment clause law has also raised questions about the
mediating role of public schools, at least with respect to the schools' role in the
inculcation of religious values. Yet the traditional commitment of the schools to teach
children such fundamental civic and moral virtues as integrity, cooperation, self-
reliance, and responsibility remains central to the task of public education. In
teaching children these "habits of the heart" in moral education, the schools are
engaged in the core mediating role of value transmission.
The schools also perform many of the custodial and child-nurturing functions
associated with the parental role. In addition, the schools by nature reflect a
mediation-like commitment to first amendment values so fundamental that this fact
alone may establish their essential character as mediating institutions. The schools
stimulate the development of students' capacities to discover their own forms of
meaning and purpose, as illustrated by the way schools nurture both the values and
the skills related to self-expression. 184
Because of the hybrid character of their source of authority, 185 schools also stand
in an unusual interactive relationship with both the private family sphere and the
public governmental sphere. Parents are required by law to see that their children are
educated, but they can provide that education in private schools or, increasingly in
many states, they can provide it at home. Thus the parental choice to enroll children
in a public school does contain a theoretically significant voluntariness, even though
the financial incentive to accept public school enrollment is for most people
overwhelming. The factor of local control 18 6 and the tradition of parent-teacher
interaction also reinforce at least some sense of accountability from school to parent.
181. BERER & NEuIAuS, supra note 162, at 19.
182. See supra section I.A.I.
183. The disciplinary issues in racially integrated schools, for example, have raised questions about
the legitimate authority of the school principal to rule his educational flock as a father. . . . But it is difficult
to understand the origins of this conflict without understanding that the children in this educational family were
black and the 'parents' largely white. Does father know best when father is white and the putative child is black?
How do black families, including fathers and mothers with their own children, respond to a family model of
public education in an era of rights consciousness?
Msoom, supra note 67, at 458.
184. See section H.C.
185. See supra section I.A.
186. See supra section I.A.1.
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Moreover, the major role of public schools in influencing the maturation and
developmental processes of young people, both intellectually and psychologically,
places them squarely in a mediating role between the tradition of family autonomy
that protects children and the tradition of individual autonomy that frees them. The
individual tradition accords each child the eventual right of full participation in
democratic institutions, public and private. But the fulfillment of individualism's
promise of personal liberty depends upon the maintenance of other traditions
necessary to give it full meaning. One reason the family is so significant in the
democratic structure is that children, born with undeveloped natural faculties, find in
families the protection and the intrafamily commitments through which they develop
the skills and attitudes that are essential to their capacity to enjoy "the Blessings of
Liberty." 187
Children have no more fundamental "right" than this claim to affirmative
nurturing, because without it the promise of individual autonomy is an empty
abstraction. The needs of children thus go far toward justifying the preferred position
of marriage and family in the constitutional framework. 188 This same level of need
among children explains why "the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent
with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic
presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive
of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and reward-
ing." 1 89 Schools play a similar, though more detached, role in helping children
benefit from their status as minors within the family tradition in fulfillment of their
right to be prepared for entrance into the tradition of individual autonomy. In this
sense, the family and the school are much more like each other than either of them
is like any other social institution.
Finally, schools can be understood to be mediating institutions because, despite
their battered present state, they truly function as "little republics' '--tiny communi-
ties of learning in which all participants have the interactive opportunity (and, indeed,
the constitutionally mandated task) of developing those "habits of the heart" without
which there is no larger community. As Robert Bellah and his associates have
documented, the decline of community in this day of ardent individualism creates one
of the nation's most urgent needs. 190 The general decline of community-based
environments for public schools also hampers the important educational and social
process James Coleman calls "intergenerational closure," in which student-teacher
interaction is part of a larger school-community interaction involving parents who
know each other. 91
"A school is not the world. And yet it is a world, a small republic of the intellect
within the political community." 192 When this element of life in a public school is
187. See Hafen, supra note 119, at 476-83.
188. See id. at 473-76.
189. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662, 638-39 (1979).
190. See R. BEu.LI, R. MADsEN, W. SutuaN, A. SwliLER, AND S. Twro.N, HABrrs OF TE HEART (1985).
191. Coleman, Schools and the Communities They Serve, 66 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 527, 530 (1985).
192. BRANN, supra note 20, at 146.
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understood for both its educational and its social significance, we are more likely to
understand the seriousness of impairing the trust and the natural structures of
cooperation and authority on which intimate communities-mediating structures-
depend. 193 We are also more likely to see that schools are not simply government
agencies, any more than they are simply extensions of the family. Public schools are
institutions in their own right and might profitably be seen as such from a legal
perspective that would entitle schools to a greater degree of judicial deference (when
educational matters are implicated) than could be claimed by other governmental
entities. 194
C. First Amendment Values in the Public Schools
In the public school environment, freedom of expression has unique meaning-
both for school age children and for the school as a mediating institution. This
discussion assumes, of course, that the first amendment interests of parents are not
directly implicated. 195
1. Free Speech Theories and Students
Professor John Garvey has pointed out that most judicial approaches to free
speech for school children make one of two mistakes: either they assume that the
speech rights are presumptively plenary, as would be the case in an adult public
forum; or they discount adult concepts of free expression by some arbitrary factor
because children are involved. A more thoughtful approach would recognize the
instrumental value of free expression for children by acknowledging both their lack
of mature capacity and their need to develop powers of expression, then by asking
how first amendment concepts might best be applied toward the end of developing
expressive powers. 196 We are then asking a question that is more in the nature of
educational philosophy than it is a question of constitutional law. That fact alone
should make judges cautious about assuming that the blunt tools of legal (even
Such an association is, to be sure, a curtailed commonwealth; it is an unnatural city deprived of the dignity that
attaches to communities into which people are born and from which they die their natural death. . . . [L]ife in
such a school has, albeit in a blither fashion, the chief characteristic of the larger republic: that the more each
person does in his own behalf, the richer is the public realm.
Id. at 146-47.
193. This, reports Gerald Grant, is why we are mistaken to regard schools as factories, in which the rules are
designed to produce maximum efficiency and formalistic impersonality. There must be "emotional commitment" and
"agreement on the . . . worthwhileness of what is produced." For "education by its very nature must occur in a
community, must draw on emotional commitments, engender sympathy for others, and produce something in us that we
feel has great value." Grant, supra note 103, at 146-47.
194. See Skillen, Changing Assumptions in the Public Governance of Education: What Has Changed and What
Ought to Change, in DEsiocAcy AND THE RENEWAL OF Pusuc EDuA-ro, 108-09 (R. Neuhaus ed. 1987) (Schools "have a
life of their own with an identity and quality peculiar to them .... Thus, government should view schools "'as distinct
agencies of education instead of mere departments of state.").
195. Parents have at times attempted to influence the curriculum and other matters of educational policy, often by
citing their own interests in religious liberty. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. School, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986); Hafen, Privacy in the Family and the Home, at 22.02[41[c] in 3 PIVAcY LAw AND PRAcncE (G. Trubow
ed. 1987). Those issues are beyond the scope of this Article, which concerns itself only with the expression rights of
students and the relationship under first amendment doctrine between students and school personnel.
196. See Garvey, supra note 159, at 321.
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"constitutional") analysis are a preferred substitute for the subtle, personal, extended
process we call education.
Children, to a greater or lesser degree depending upon their age, lack the rational
ability that is a prerequisite to the meaningful application of traditional free speech
theories. For that reason, most standard theoretical justifications for free speech have
only limited relevance in the public school environment.
For example, John Stuart Mill excluded children from his celebrated principle of
liberty, with which free speech as the "marketplace of ideas" is closely associ-
ated. 197 Other advocates of liberty have recognized the same limitation. Jefferson, for
example, believed that, "[C]hildren should not be forced to be men too
soon.... there is a time in childhood when the memory and not the judgment should
be exercised."198 Similarly, Plato distinguished between preparatory education and
the serious education of the dialectical process. Without the foundational discipline
of the paideia to prepare the "puppies," he thought their attempts at true educational
dialogue would be little "more than a playful yapping." 199 As Justice Stewart put it,
"a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.' '20 And from Anna Freud's per-
spective in psychology, a child's "confidence is shattered by his critical powers being
too early awakened." '20' Thus, a child is "not permitted that measure of indepen-
dence, or able to exercise that maturity of judgment, which a system of free
expression rests upon." '202
It is precisely because of children's inability to judge the meaning and
implications of expression in the school marketplace that special establishment clause
rules have been developed, prohibiting formal group prayer in public schools while
allowing it in legislative chambers. 203 Yet many courts read Tinker as requiring the
use of standard free speech analysis in school cases, shifting the burden of proof and
requiring school personnel to justify any restrictions on expression on the basis of
disruption or harm. The heavily freighted presumptions of adult civil liberties cases
force these courts to assume, whether consciously or not, that they are dealing with
rational adults who can make their own mature judgments about the normative nature
or the state sponsorship of any expression they hear in such places as a school paper.
The Eighth Circuit, for example, concluded in Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School
197. It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the
maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children or of young persons below the age which the law
may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others
must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. . . .But as soon as [they] have
attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction of persuasion
compulsion . . . is no longer admissible as a means to their own good....
Mi., supra note 156, at 13-14.
198. BRa.A, supra note 20, at 81.
199. Id. at 17.
200. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)(Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)).
201. See \Vir, supra note 151, at 73.
202. EF.itso., supra note 159, at 496-97. "This does not mean that the First Amendment extends no protection to
children; it does mean that children are governed by different rules." Id.
203. Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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District that an official high school newspaper was a public forum and was therefore
subject to a broad reading of Tinker, because (among other similar facts) the
beginning issue each school year published a policy statement that "the articles and
editorials reflected the view of the [student] staff and not the administrators or faculty
of the high school.' '204 Query whether this same reasoning would allow the school to
post a copy of the Ten Commandments on the walls of Hazelwood High School
without violating the establishment clause, so long as small print at the bottom of the
poster states that the poster does not necessarily reflect the views of the administration
or faculty. 20 5
Consider now the application of particular free speech theories to children in the
schools. The marketplace theory, introduced by the previous reference to Mill, has
general application, but has been recognized in the court decisions of this century
primarily in cases involving political speech. After some hesitation in its first few
cases, 20 6 the Supreme Court invoked the first amendment to bring ideological and
other minorities within the marketplace of legitimate political expression. 20 7 Pursuing
this attitude into the broader realm of intellectual inquiry during the red-baiting era of
the 1950s, the Court placed academic freedom for college faculty alongside political
expression as an area "in which government should be extremely reticent to
tread.' '208 The marketplace principle was extended in the 1960s and 1970s to include
those who challenged prevailing cultural and social, as well as political, orthodoxies.
While these free speech cases are typically viewed as protecting individual civil
liberty, the boundaries erected around the marketplace of ideas indicate how much its
ultimate commitment views rational debate as crucial to the health and the long term
progress of society. In addition to excluding children from the marketplace because
they lack the intellectual capacity to engage in reasoned discourse, the theory also
excludes obscenity on the grounds that it lacks "the slightest redeeming social
importance.' '209 The social interest in free expression is also at stake in the role of a
public school.
A public school has powerful connections with the political, intellectual, and
social goals of the free marketplace of ideas, not because the school is literally part
of the public marketplace, but because a principal task of education is the
204. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (8th Cir. 1986).
205. Under current interpretations, the establishment clause is violated by a state law that requires the posting of a
copy of the Ten Commandments on the walls of public classrooms. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
206. The premises for today's accepted free speech doctrine are taken from dissents or concurrences in the early
cases. See, e.g., "[Tihe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market. . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
207. These cases implicitly adopted Mill's assumption that unorthodox ideas should be included in the public
dialogue to allow both "the opportunity of exchanging error for truth" and to allow "the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth produced by its collision with error." Mita, supra note 156, at 21.
208. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). Academic freedom has not yet been identified as
a constitutional right independent of general freedom of expression.
209. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (emphasis added). Thus, obscenity is not constitutionally
protected, despite its obvious character as a form of speech, because "[To equate the free and robust exchange of ideas
and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First
Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
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development of the rational powers that change the public square from a place for
"playful yapping" and mob rule into a place for the mature public discourse that is
"indispensable to the practice of self-government." '210 As part of this preparatory
role, public schools must train the "Nation's future... leaders" through "wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude
of tongues.' "211
Yet the precise way in which a given student's intellectual skill might best be
developed is a crucial question of educational policy, more than it is a question of
constitutional law. The mere absence of restraint is unlikely to be the best means
toward the end of developing rational capacity. But it is virtually impossible for
judicial interpretation in student expression cases to achieve much more than the
removal of restraints. Of course judicial intervention can also prohibit coercion of the
mind in a school, 212 but to mark the extremes between coercion and intellectual
anarchy is barely the beginning in analyzing the methodologies of educational
development.
The spirit of dogmatism and the Inquisition are wrong not only because they
violate the spirit of the first amendment; they are also wrong because they don't work
as an educational proposition. No student can learn to read or play the piano or
understand mathematics without voluntary involvement to some important degree. I
can lead a child to a book, but I can't make her read it. Even less can I make her
understand it, if that is against her will. Yet a child needs also to be taught in order
to learn. If my child wants to have "freedom of expression" at the piano, he must
submit himself to the discipline of the authoritarian rules of music and the demanding
expectations of a music teacher over many years. If his teacher's role in assisting his
eventual expression consists primarily of not restraining him, his "freedom of
expression" will be little more than idle noisemaking. It is the place of educational
philosophy and methodology to find, according to each pupil's needs, the right
balance between too much direction and not enough. By contrast, it is the place of
constitutional interpretation to avoid actual harm at the utter extremes of that process.
Thus, while it helps avoid the uncritical application of adult free expression doctrine
to say that we should guarantee free speech rights for children in ways that "play an
instrumental role in advancing the search for knowledge and truth," 2 13 the reasonable
judgment calls about that process are essentially questions of educational policy.
The Court's exploration of marketplace notions in Board of Education v. Pico214
in 1984 illustrates the limitations on the judiciary's ability to supervise, in the name
of a free marketplace, processes that are inherently educational. Pico challenged the
right of a school board to remove books from a school library because of offensive
210. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986) (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW
BAstc HISTORY OF THE UNIED STATES 228 (1968)).
211. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). Accord Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
212. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
213. Garvey, supra note 159, at 344.
214. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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content. A plurality of three Justices believed the first amendment guarantees students
a "right to know," which assures them of affirmative access to whatever the library
contains. Two additional Justices thought the problem should be explored further by
lower courts, while four entered vigorous dissents. Virtually all of the substantive
questions raised by the case were left unresolved, in part because it is so difficult to
use constitutional doctrines to deal with the kinds of educational policy questions
raised by the case.
The Pico Court unanimously agreed that school boards, as a matter of
discretionary judgment, must control the curriculum, select the text books, and place
initial orders for library books. Even on the disputed issue of removing books already
in the library, the plurality would allow removal that is determined according to
"educational suitability" and "pervasive vulgarity," rather than due to the arbitrary
supression of ideas. But it is perfectly obvious that ideas about suitability and
vulgarity will differ from one board member or judge to another and that nothing
peculiar to legal training ensures better understanding of those subjective questions.
This puzzle is amplified by the contradiction that allows complete school board
discretion in placing initial orders but prevents it in removal. 21 5
When reasonable minds can so easily differ on such issues, and when
constitutional concepts add so little to our understanding, the most important question
is simply "who gets to decide" about educational policy. That question returns us to
the basic issue raised by the students at Berkeley in 1964: who does decide what
happens in an educational institution, not only in the classroom but also in officially
sponsored co-curricular and extra-curricular activities? In a public school, the
marketplace of ideas cannot be controlled by judges as a practical matter, nor can it
be controlled by students as a matter of personal maturity; therefore, if faculty and
administrators lack the discretion to control it, there is little meaningful marketplace
at all-neither in the school nor in the public square of the future.
Second, similar issues arise in viewing the connections between public schools
and the idea of popular sovereignty as a theoretical justification for free speech. As
most fully articulated by Alexander Meiklejohn, 2 6 freedom of expression serves the
purpose of protecting both the individual's right of participation in self-government
and the right of democratic society to retain ultimate authority in the people. A more
recent variation on this theme is the "checking value" theory, which argues for broad
protection of public commentary on government as a way of checking against
governmental abuse. 217 This theory reflects the origins of social contract theory,
215. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion expressed "some doubt that there is a theoretical distinction between
removal of a book and failure to acquire a book." 457 U.S. 853, 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But he believed
that removal is more likely to suggest the presence of "an impermissible political motivation." Id. (quoting Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 638 F.2d 404,436 (2d Cir. 1980)). The difficulty with this distinction is its implication that ifjudges could
only know the "real reasons" why school boards or library committees select or fail to select particular books (presumably
text books as well) in the first instance, the judiciary should supervise their every choice.
216. See, e.g., A. MEnumoe, PoLmcAL F.EEoo.%t: THE CoNSTITUoNAL POWERS oFr i PEOPLE (1960); Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
217. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Ami. B. FouND. REs. J. 521. See also Schauer,
The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALF. L. Rev. 761 (1986).
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assuring the accountability of government to those from whom the state's authority
is derived.2 18
But, although no one has a greater stake than students in the outcome of school
board elections, students do not have the constitutional right to vote, again due to
their lack of rational maturity. Given that complete limitation on the most funda-
mental of democratic rights, public schools are not accountable to their students.
However, the popular sovereignty theory combined with our understanding of the
general relationship between child, parent, and state does suggest that schools are in
an important sense accountable to the parents of their students. The parental interest
is reflected in their right to elect school boards. Parents also represent by their own
voting their children's stake in the outcome of school elections and policymaking
through the parental role that determines a child's best interests.
This view of first amendment theory reinforces the concept that the schools are
not merely state agents, but are mediating institutions whose authority is derived both
from parents and from the delegation of state power. Application of the checking
value theory argues for local public awareness of educational activities and for a
strong spirit of disclosure to enable communication and cooperation between schools
and parents. However, it does not support the assumption that student media
organizations should play the same independent role in providing public evaluations
of school policies-even though there is great educational value in encouraging
public comment by students. The analogy to the public press in the democratic
marketplace is inapposite, due to the absence of ultimate student authority. To the
extent that public evaluation of educational policy originates in parental interests,
however, the theory of popular sovereignty is more applicable.
In addition, there is recourse beyond the schoolhouse gates that can help parents
ensure accountability for the soundness of educational policy from educational rather
than only constitutional or other legal perspectives. School administrators are
accountable to local and state school boards, but are also accountable for academic
quality to non-governmental accreditation agencies. Thus, when decisions regarding
curricular issues or other matters of educational policy impinge on self-expression
interests in ways that create an overall climate that is hostile to sound educational
values, accreditation may be jeopardized on academic grounds.
The interest in self-governance also applies to students in a longer term sense.
As holders of inchoate rights of democratic citizenship, students have a high stake in
the development of their own critical powers to act in the future as sovereign citizens.
However, as with the marketplace of ideas, the best means of developing an
enlightened citizenry is not dictated by acceptance of the desirability of the end. It is
an educational rather than a constitutional problem to determine what pedagogy is
best calculated to achieve the objective of teaching democratic skills and values.
Within that framework, the nature of student activities calculated to provide
experience in self-governance are clearly important matters of educational policy.
218. "The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the government." N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
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To place priority on the obligation of schools to teach citizenship skills is to urge
a broadening, not a narrowing, of educational supervision in extracurricular activi-
ties. That idea was at the core of the Fraser Court's rationale in reaffirming the
importance of school control in a student assembly, perhaps precisely because the
assembly involved student body elections. Some would see the election context in
Fraser as grounds for broader protection for student autonomy in recognition of the
priority of political activity in free expression theory. However, the Court made clear
that when immature and impressionable school children are involved, school officials
can best promote the first amendment's interest in teaching democratic processes by
maintaining standards that "teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
order." 219
A third theoretical justification for freedom of expression is the general notion
of self-expression as an aspect of personal autonomy. This idea differs from the
marketplace and popular sovereignty theories by emphasizing the individual interest
in expression, quite apart from-and perhaps even contrary to-the broader social
interest. Because this theory is ultimately grounded in self-autonomy, it does not
generally apply to children, whose very lack of actual autonomous power dictates
their need for protection against their own immaturity. Furthermore, it is unclear
whether the first amendment's interest in freedom of expression should protect broad
individual autonomy. While some of the Supreme Court's earlier opinions suggested
that a general right to personal autonomy might develop from among the "penum-
bras" of underlying first amendment values, no such right has in fact emerged. 220
Moreover, autonomy-based self-expression theories are arguably "unsound... for
they fail to differentiate a theory of free speech from a theory of general personal
liberty .... "1221
Even acknowledging these limitations, however, the core idea of personal
dignity inherent in viewing self-expression as an end in itself suggests the value of
protecting especially private and personal forms of student expression in a first
amendment theory. For the most part, the forms of expression that relate to self-
identity and self-realization are directly related to the role of mediating institutions as
carriers of meaning. Good educational policy thus gives high priority to providing
students with opportunities for self-discovery and self-definition. Because students
left to their own imagination may act out this basic urge in ways destructive to
themselves or others, it is especially important that schools provide children with
constructive opportunities for distinguishing themselves--"as a basketball player, a
mechanic, a social critic, a wit." 222 For that reason, especially in dealing with older
students, an educationally sound high school journalism program would encourage a
robust exchange of views. As with opportunities to learn the skills necessary for
participation in the marketplace of ideas or the skills of citizenship, the development
219. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986).
220. See Hafen, supra note 119, at 517-27.
221. Schauer, supra note 217, at 774. For contrary views, see the sources cited in id. at 772 n.52.
222. Garvey, supra note 159, at 365.
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of self-expression opportunities is almost always a matter of discretionary educational
policy and methodology, not a matter for judicial supervision.
Within the most private and personal sphere, however, a child's most intimate
sense of self should also be entitled to constitutional protection of the type established
in Tinker. Suppose that a child wishes to pray, privately and inaudibly, before taking
a final examination. Or suppose a student assigned to write a theme on his most
important friend decides to describe his relationship with God. Would the establish-
ment clause dictate that a teacher should tell these students that their expression is not
permitted, in view of legal concerns about religion in public schools? I think not,
since no appearance of school sanction is involved in the child's expression and since
the free exercise interests of the child's parents are otherwise likely to be threatened.
Indeed, not to allow personal expression of this kind comes very close to the coercion
of belief that was eloquently condemned as violating the "freedom of [the] mind" in
the Barnette case. 223
This first amendment interest is not dependent upon a child's having developed
mature capacities of expression, in part because it is derived from the core right of the
child's parents to direct value transmission processes in rearing their children. In
addition, it is precisely because a child's young mind is impressionable that coercive
influences applied to highly sensitive political and religious values-such as saluting
the flag or offering a private prayer--can be so damaging. These are, of course,
interests in private expression that do not require access to official school channels of
communication. 224
2. The First Amendment Right to Education
We have seen that traditional first amendment theory has minimal direct
application to children, not because children have no interest in the values for which
the amendment stands, but because they lack the capacity to profit from the
essentially negative posture developed by the case law. The system of freedom of
expression operates on free market principles in which traditional first amendment
doctrine plays "a largely negative role" designed primarily to exclude state
interference unless important social interests dictate special reasons for limitations.
As a result, "[ihe most challenging problems in first amendment theory today lie in
the prospect of using law affirmatively to promote more effective functioning of the
system of freedom of expression.' '225 Among those problems is the need to clarify
our understanding of children's affirmative right to education as an expression of the
first amendment's most basic values.
There is little question that each child indeed has a right to education, but
enforcement of the right is problematic. Horace Mann believed in an "immutable
principle of natural law . . . antecedent to all human institutions . . . which proves
the absolute right to an education of every human being that comes into the world;
223. 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
224. See infra text accompanying notes 322-29.
225. EmEsRo-. supra note 159, at 627 (emphasis added).
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and which, of course proves the correlative duty of every government to see that the
means of that education are provided for all.' 226 State governments accepted Mann's
argument during the 19th century, creating a vast system of publicly funded schools,
which is by itself an impressive acknowledgement of the right of children to
education. Recognition of this same right moved the National Commission on
Excellence to conclude in 1983 that, because of what appeared to be an inadequate
national commitment to educational quality, "a basic promise is not being kept." 227
The Supreme Court similarly found no need to "dispute [the] proposition" that
"education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective
exercise of First Amendment freedoms.' '228 However, the Court does not regard this
right as "fundamental" for purposes of equal protection analysis in disputes about
disparities in local funding levels. 22 9
Children's right to education is similar to and associated with their right to
parental care. John Locke believed that parents owe an obligation to "Nature" to
"nourish and educate" their children until their "understanding be fit to take the
government of [their] will." 30 By this means, parents would prepare children to
enter the marketplace of ideas as rational beings. Thus, said Locke, "we see how
natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded
on the same principle.''231 Compulsory education statutes represent the law's
commitment to ensuring parental compliance with this duty. State constitutional
provisions and a variety of statutes seek to ensure fulfillment of other basic
educational rights. Still, enforcement of educational quality goals is limited simply
because the law lacks not only legal but practical power to enforce most of the broad
affirmative obligations involved in teaching. This is true in part because overregula-
tion can quickly choke off the free academic climate essential to meaningful teaching
and leaming.
At the same time, legal and educational policy can uphold the interest of both
children and society in the right to education by maintaining minimum quantitative
and qualitative standards that are subject to some forms of specific enforcement. For
example, even when parents elect to send their children to private schools or to
educate them at home, "There is no doubt as to the power of a State ... to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.' '232 The state
can also "insist that attendance at private schools ... be at institutions which
provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and
cover prescribed subjects of instruction. ' 2 33 Among public schools, a wide array of
state and, more recently, federal standards also create specific enforcement mecha-
226. Quoted in BRUBACHER, supra note 28, at 556-57.
227. A NAnO, AT RISK, supra note 9, at 12.
228. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
229. The judiciary has "neither the ability [nor] the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech
or the most informed electoral choice," even though the Court does not doubt that "these may be desirable goals of a
system of freedom of expression." Id. at 36.
230. J. LocKE, THE SECOND TREA-nmE ON1 CIVIL GovE. isEr 56, 59 (1690).
231. Id. 61.
232. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
233. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968).
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nisms. Along with state standards for physical facilities, curriculum, and teacher
qualifications, important policies assure the minimal educational opportunity rights of
disadvantaged students.
In addition, the maintenance within the schools of the authority patterns
necessary for truly effective education is, paradoxically, one important means of
fulfilling children's educational rights. Thus, a child's right not to be abandoned to
the laissez-faire isolation of adult freedom of expression concepts may be among the
core values of the right to education.
John Rawls included children within his principles of justice, but because of
their acknowledged lack of rational maturity, his theory posits that adult guardians
should make decisions on children's behalf that would reflect what the children would
want for themselves if they enjoyed adult capacity. 234 Because certain forms of
authoritarian direction do enhance educational development, 235 a child's right to
education argues for such direction, even when it overrides preferences a child may
express while still a child. Moreover, to the extent that the uncritical transfer of adult
free expression theory to public school cases undermines a school's affirmative
assertion of educational authority, children's rights to educational development are
undermined.
Much of the children's liberation literature reflects the fear that any authoritarian
interference with the lives of children violates their moral and constitutional right to
personal autonomy. 236 As noted earlier, 237 this concern stems more from ideological
commitments to "freedom as a way of life" than it does from evidence that authority
patterns have in fact been harmful to children. Nonetheless, the preservation of the
authority patterns essential to educational quality is not only in the best interest of
children, it may be a primary means of preserving their most vital long-range rights.
On the other hand, constitutional interpretations that call into serious question the
fundamental authority of teachers and administrators tend to foster noncommittal
attitudes among school personnel. They may fear they have no right to give direction
to their students, or they may fear that in giving direction they will encounter the
chilling effects of threatened litigation. When that happens, the loss is not only to
their students, but to the larger interests of a society that depends upon an educated
citizenry.23 8 For that reason, the sustaining of legal and educational policies that
encourage the assumption of teaching resonsibility is in direct fulfillment of the
otherwise unenforceable right to education.
In summary, while children clearly have the right to be educated, their right is
not susceptible of total enforcement, because enforcement depends so heavily upon
the fulfillment of affirmative duties by schools that are beyond the capacity of courts
to supervise in productive, specific ways. The institutional strength of the schools,
however, affects their ability to deliver on the promise of education. That strength
234. J. RA is, A THEORY OF Jus'mcE 209, 244, 249 (1971). See also Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification for
Children's Rights, 44 HxAv. EDuc. REv. 142, 156 (1974).
235. See supra section I.C.2.
236. See Hafen, supra note 16, at 651-56.
237. See supra section I.B.3.
238. See supra section I.C.2.
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also affects the schools' ability to play the larger mediating role within which good
education occurs. Just as the institutional vitality of family life significantly enhances
a child's basic right to be nurtured, the institutional vitality of schools contributes
toward fulfilling the right to be educated. Institutional academic freedom is thus
relevant both to children's rights and to the distinct right of schools as mediating
institutions to their own institutional autonomy.
III. INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY
As noted in Part I, the social as well as the legal momentum of recent years has
reduced discretionary authority wherever it was found, in public schools, juvenile
courts, in churches, families, and elsewhere. Vulnerable persons need protection
against state overreaching through inappropriate and subjective discretionary actions;
however, the law's unwillingness to sustain the core sense of institutional authority
within a mediating institution can ultimately impair the institution's capacity to fulfill
its contribution to first amendment values, at the expense of both individuals and the
larger society. For a variety of reasons, including the excesses of the earlier era in
which authority structures were seldom questioned, we now give such priority to
preventing abuses of discretionary authority, public or private, that it is hardly
fashionable to raise questions about current priorities. But our ongoing critique of our
own institutions and values suggests the wisdom of constant inquiry.
For most of our history, we had little reason to ask about constitutional sources
of authority for schools as institutions, because that authority was a given condition.
Now that we have constitutionalized so many old questions, however, the Supreme
Court has begun quietly-almost as a series of asides-to consider the place of an
educational institution, qua institution, within first amendment theory. 239 This
nascent idea deserves exploration; otherwise, our traditional assumption that the first
amendment is concerned essentially with the relationship between individuals and the
state will continue to cast public schools exclusively in a state role, which our
established constructs view as the chilling censor-and hardly the generous spon-
sor-of the values of freedom of expression. But as discussed in Parts I and II, public
schools are not mere extensions of the state, either in the ultimate origins of their
authority or in the many parent-like and mediating functions they perform. Thus they
deserve consideration as first amendment creatures in their own right.
Against this historical and conceptual background, we now consider the idea of
institutional academic freedom for public schools. The issues and relationships that
could arise in such an examination are numerous and complicated, offering many fit
subjects for future research and analysis. For example, we might compare the
problems of higher education with those of public schools, perhaps drawing
distinctions among various age-based levels within the public schools; we could
examine the need for institutional freedom from external forces, including govern-
ment regulation; we could consider-as academic freedom concepts usually have-
the need to protect faculty members from undue interference, either from the
239. See infra section III.A.2.
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institutional administration or from external sources; the roles of faculty and students
in institutional governance might also be examined. Some or all of these issues should
be compared with the entire field of first amendment jurisprudence, linking particular
points of tension in the educational world to various free expression problems in the
larger public and private spheres.
However, for reasons of scope, Part HI limits itself to only one small sub-cluster
in this large constellation of issues: the institutional authority of a public school to
regulate student expression in curricular and extra-curricular activities. I will argue
that, so long as matters of educational policy and practice are implicated, the courts
should defer to the rational decisions of faculty and administrative personnel. This
focus is suggested by the Supreme Court's recent interest in libraries, student body
assemblies, and school newspapers. While these may appear to be narrow matters
calling for finely focused attention, the Court's interest in them implies that problems
arising in this area represent the still uncertain but important middle ground between
the traditional curriculum (which the Court considers subject to broad discretionary
control by school officials)240 and private expression by students in realms removed
from any official school activity or educational policy (which Tinker defines as
presumptively student expression territory). 241The concepts developed in response to
these cases will have much to say about the future educational environment in
American schools.
A. Institutional Academic Freedom
The following discussion explores a theoretical framework that reverses the
constitutional presumptions derived from adult first amendment theory that give
preferred protection to student expression in educational environments. Because
Tinker has established some protection for student expression as a beginning premise,
this Section considers the effect of institutional academic freedom in protecting the
discretionary judgment of school officials in the broad educational sphere of public
schools-so long as the judgment has both a rational and an educational basis.
Because this source of institutional protection is also grounded in first amendment
theory, it can be an acceptable basis for analysis without undermining constitutional
protection for limited, private student expression outside the curriculum and
extracurriculum.
1. The Development of Academic Freedom Rights
Until well past 1950, American courts deferred heavily to the discretionary
judgments of those responsible for the operation of educational (and most other)
institutions. Chief administrators exercised broad discretion over faculty as employ-
ees of their institutions, while legislatures and governing boards enjoyed similar
latitude in their dealings with school administators. At the same time, longstanding
customary patterns insulated schools from much external interference, leaving natural
240. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
241. See infra text accompanying notes 322-29.
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authority patterns both informal and rarely challenged. 242 The earliest recognition of
a need to protect the academic work of faculty occurred in discussions about the
importance of free inquiry in higher education, which has been traditionally
concerned with the discovery of new knowledge, while public schools were
concerned more with the transmission of knowledge. The idea of academic freedom
for communities of scholars originated in German universities, where the
"Lehrfreiheit" of the faculty blended with an interest in institutional autonomy
because administrators were elected by the faculty. 243 The lay control of American
universities, however, led to an almost exclusive emphasis on faculty autonomy-
indeed, the institution's lay governing board was often seen as the opponent of
academic freedom for the faculty. 2
44
Consistent with such beginnings, the recent emergence of academic freedom as
a constitutionally protected interest occurred primarily in higher education cases
involving faculty speech. The first cases arose during the anti-communism waves of
the 1950s, leading to explicit protection for expression and inquiry by university
faculty within the broader theory of freedom of expression. 245 The Tinker case then
extended protection for on-campus expression both to the public schools and to
students, without mentioning academic freedom as such.
246
Even though academic freedom has been acknowledged as a worthy companion
to political speech, thus enjoying the highest priority among first amendment
values, 247 it has not been accorded the status of an independent constitutional right.248
This historical pattern demonstrates that first amendment freedom of expression
was used to chip away gradually at the original status quo in which institutional
authority was presumed to enjoy a nearly irrebuttable presumption of deference in its
favor. Through this process, academic freedom emerged as an individual, not an
institutional, right. Indeed, educational institutions have frequently been, as state
agents, the adversary party against whom academic freedom was asserted. For this
reason, as the law has come to recognize first amendment interests on the nation's
campuses, the direction and momentum-accelerated by the student movements of
242. See, e.g., Murphey, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAw & Co.rr, z. PRosa. 447
(1963); Note, Academic Freedom and the Law, 46 YALE L.J. 670 (1937).
243. "[I]nstitutional autonomy was perceived as an integral element of the theory of academic freedom and played
an important role in making German institutions among the intellectually freest in the world." Finkin, On "Institutional'"
Academic Freedom, 61 TEx. L. REv. 817, 825 (1983).
244. Id. at 828. In 1940 the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American
Colleges jointly adopted a "Statement on Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure." This Statement held that
"Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual
teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition."
EMERSON, supra note 159, at 593-94. The primary vehicle for assuring faculty protection from administrative and other
forms of outside censorship was the right to tenure.
245. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
246. "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available
to teachers and students." 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
247. "[Alcademic freedom and political expression fare] areas in which government should be extremely reticent
to tread." 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of
transcendent value to all of us and . . . is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment . 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967).
248. See Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in TmE
CoNsrTuoNAL STArus OF AcAnEmic FREEDoM (,V. Metzger ed. 1977); F.tE'.soN, supra note 159, at 611-16.
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the 1960s--of legal development have been almost entirely in the direction of
reducing institutional authority. This background makes it difficult to conceive of
academic freedom in other than individualistic terms.
Nevertheless, the inherent first amendment interests of educational institutions
have not totally escaped recognition and, in fact, may now be asserting themselves
in ways that will balance our understanding of academic freedom as having both
institutional and individual components. To the extent that the interests of faculty and
professional educational administrators are blended through their common commit-
ment to academic values in a school, an institutional perspective on academic
freedom is theoretically consistent with the original German concepts. 249
2. Institutional Academic Freedom in Supreme Court Cases
As early as Sweezy v. New Hampshire,250 which upheld the individual academic
freedom interests of a faculty member, Justice Frankfurter recognized in his now
well-known concurring opinion the "essential" institutional "freedoms of a univer-
sity" to "'determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.' ,25 This pro-
vocative language did not become the rationale for a holding of the Court, however,
until Justice Powell relied on it in his controlling opinion in University of California
Regents v. Bakke in 1978. Bakke examined the constitutionality of a university's
medical school admissions program, which included a voluntary affirmative action
plan that allegedly discriminated on the basis of race. Justice Powell found that,
because the use of racial classification made the university's action suspect, it could
be upheld only on the basis of a substantial state interest. He located such an interest,
citing Justice Frankfurter, in a university's freedom to create a diverse student body
by determining "who may be admitted to study" as a matter of educational policy.
The first amendment origins of this institutional right made it "a countervailing
constitutional interest" that, among other factors, outweighed the competing equal
protection interest in avoiding discrimination based on racial classifications. 25 2
Then in 1985, a unanimous Court cited both Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy opinion
and Justice Powell's Bakke opinion in upholding the University of Michigan's dis-
missal of a student for academic reasons, relying heavily and explicitly on the
"prerogatives" and the "academic freedom" of "state and local educational insti-
tutions. "253 The Ewing opinion, written by Justice Stevens, addressed a classic issue
of academic expertise and discretion the collective judgment of a university faculty
249. See supra note 243. A different interpretation is possible if the original institutional authority of German
universities is thought to be derived politically from the consent of the faculty, rather than from the unity of academic
purpose that arises from combined faculty and administration commitments to the values of free inquiry.
250. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
251. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12).
252. "Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a
special concern of the First Amendment." 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
253. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1985) (emphasis added).
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committee regarding the academic qualifications of a student.254 Rejecting the stu-
dent's claim that the University had misjudged his fitness for continued enrollment,
the Court would not override "the faculty's professional judgment" unless "it is such
a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person
or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.' 25 Noting
that "considerations of profound importance counsel restrained judicial review of the
substance of academic decisions," the Court stressed the judiciary's unsuitability to
"evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily
by faculty members of public educational institutions." Justice Stevens then explained
this deferential attitude in part by reference to institutional academic freedom: "Ac-
ademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among teachers and students... but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on auton-
omous decisionmaking by the academy itself.'' 256
Lest more be made of Ewing's language than the Court intended, the case clearly
dealt with discretionary, professional judgment in the subjective process of evaluating
academic competence. Read narrowly, its holding does little more than reaffirm prior
cases involving the academic judgment calls of university faculty. 257 At the same
time, the academic judgment here was not primarily the qualitative, subjective
evaluation of an essay or dissertation. The key facts of the case were susceptible of
sufficient objective summary that the Sixth Circuit had found for the student,
essentially on the grounds that the university's action was arbitrarily inconsistent with
its past practice in similar cases.
Ewing does represent an explicit acknowledgement of institutional academic
freedom as a first amendment right significant enough to outweigh an acknowledged
substantive due process interest, not merely a contract or property interest. The case
also expands the potential meaning of Justice Powell's use of institutional freedom in
Bakke, because its use there might have been viewed largely as an extraordinary
theoretical stretch made necessary by the peculiar demands of affirmative action as a
national policy. There were no such unusual overtones in Ewing. At the same time,
the concept of institutional first amendment interests is easier to see in Ewing than
it would be in a conflict between an educational institution and a member of its own
faculty, because the Michigan faculty and administration acted in concert, as they
often would in student-related decisions. And the student in Ewing made no first
amendment claim, which also leaves one uncertain how competing claims for the
same source of constitutional protection should be evaluated. 258
254. The student had completed four years of a six-year program, but failed a national qualifying test after having
barely completed his other requirements. His suit alleged arbitrary and capricious action by the university in violation of
his substantive due process right to continued enrollment, noting that he was the only student to fail the test who had not
been permitted to retake it.
255. 106 S. Ct. 507, 513 (1985). The Board's judgment was found "not beyond the pale of reasoned academic
decision-making" in light of the student's entire university career. Id. at 515.
256. Id. at 514 n.12 (emphasis added).
257. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
258. Justice Stevens' recognition that there might be "inconsistency" in recognizing both individual and
institutional rights suggests his awareness that competing academic freedom claims might well be considered, even if both
originate in the same constitutional source. The Supreme Court has already faced the analogous theoretical problem of
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A constitutional doctrine of academic autonomy for an educational institution
arises from the linkage between the intellectual/educational matters with which
schools are concerned and the first amendment's concern with intellectual freedom
and the unhampered nurturing of intellectual growth and educational development.
More purely "proprietary" institutional concerns, such as matters involving a
school's physical plant, for example, are outside this protected scope. For that
reason, institutional academic freedom is not broad enough to cover total institutional
autonomy.2 59 Thus, student discipline for non-academic infractions may be suffi-
ciently removed from core academic activity to call for greater due process
protections than would be appropriate in evaluations of academic performance, 260
which helps explain why the Supreme Court is less willing to sustain broad
institutional autonomy in behavioral discipline cases than it is in decisions about
curriculum. 26 1 As the Fraser case suggests, such extracurricular activities as student
publications, performances, and assemblies are--especially in a public school-even
more clearly part of the school's educational mission than non-academic disci-
pline. 262 In addition, decisions about the use of extracurricular facilities, 263 admis-
sions, curriculum content, and teaching methodology are within an institution's
academic purview, 264 because educational policy is so directly implicated by such
decisions. It can be argued that academic freedom should protect primarily the
interests of teachers and researchers rather than the administrative policy decisions of
an administration or governing board,2 65 but when administrative decisions are made
by professional educators for reasonable educational purposes, the underlying
justification for protecting academic freedom still applies. 266
When Sweezy, Bakke, and Ewing are considered together, it appears that the
educational policy decisions of universities are entitled to the full weight of academic
freedom as a preferred first amendment interest, and that this constitutional value can
outweigh the traditional presumptions favoring equal protection and substantive due
process claims. These are of course higher education cases, which could suggest a
greater need than would exist in public schools to protect the free inquiry needed for
research and discovery of new knowledge. On the other hand, public schools do need
protection against external intrusion that undermines their teaching role. Moreover,
the educational mission of a public school is more likely to be broadly
weighing the constitutional privacy claim of a child against the constitutional privacy claim of the child's parents in the
context of parental consent requirements for minors' abortions. See Hafen, supra note 119, at 511-17.
259. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub noma. Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Finkin, supra note 243.
260. See Levin, supra note 15, at 1675.
261. Compare New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) with Board
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). The argument has been persuasively made, of course, that student discipline is
also part of the educational process in public schools. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
262. "The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum,
and the civics class;. ... 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986).
263. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
264. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
265. See Finkin, supra note 243, at 851.
266. See supra note 243.
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defined than would be the case at a university, suggesting the need for a more
expansive reading of institutional authority. The public school's mission is broader
not only because of its traditional socializing role,2 67 but because the relative
dependence of its students creates the need for sufficient institutional authority to
nurture the development of their intellectual skills 268 and to protect them from the
harmful effects of undisciplined "role models." '269
B. Protection for First Amendment Values Through a Presumption of Institutional
Autonomy in Educational Matters
As we saw in Parts I and II, the first amendment is concerned in the educational
sphere with such values as free inquiry, the discovery of new truth, personal
intellectual development, and, especially in the case of public school students, the
development of citizenship skills. These are core constitutional values that serve the
interests not only of students and faculty, but of the larger community. In a
democratic society, the work of schools, colleges, and universities is a fountainhead
for the intellectual, and in many ways the moral, life of the local as well as national
community. These are intimate, nurturing processes that flourish best in the protected
enclaves we call school grounds, which represent symbolically as well as geograph-
ically a sense of distance from the noisy and undisciplined atmosphere of the political
and economic marketplace. As Justice Stevens observed in Ewing, "academic
freedom thrives . . . on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself.''270
In this sense, a school is unlike any other arm of the federal or state
governments, because non-educational institutions have fundamentally different
purposes and functions. It is perhaps for such reasons, together with the legal status
of children as minors, that the Court has construed the constitutional concepts applied
to public schools regarding procedural due process and search and seizure in minimal
as well as conceptually unique ways.27 1
The peculiar characteristics and purposes of schools, as discussed in Part II,
have much in common with other mediating institutions in which individual growth
thrives through protected spheres of intimacy. Roberto Unger and Lon Fuller have
written that "formal law" is unable to govern the full spectrum of human interaction.
As personal relationships approach the realm of "intimacy," the less structured role
of "customary law" begins to govern the interaction. This limited ability of formal
law is best illustrated by the family, the "organization" and "consciousness" of
which is "undermined by the use of legal rules and by the attempt to view relations
among persons as relationships of entitlement and duty.' '272 If formal law intrudes
excessively into family relationships, it can destroy the continuity without which
there are no family relationships. Customary law, by contrast, regulates intimate
267. See supra section I.A.2.
268. See supra section I.C.2.
269. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986).
270. 106 S. Ct. 507, 514 n.12 (1985).
271. See supra section I.2.3.
272. R. UNGER, LAw IN MODERN Socimr 55 (1976).
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associations in informal ways, including expectations about "roles and functions,"
that contribute to "stable interactional expectancies. ' 2 73
As we saw in Part II, a primary purpose of constitutional protection for
mediating institutions is to encourage this same pattern in any long term or
institutional relationship involved in stimulating the growth of first amendment
values.2 74 Much of what family members "owe" one another, for example, cannot
be enforced in a court of law. Yet a traditional sense of family duty has long
demonstrated an incredible power to produce obedience to the unenforceable. In this
way, the commitments of marriage and kinship have taught parents and children
significant personal and social values that are learned in depth only through truly
"belonging" to a larger order. The very nature of these values requires that they
develop voluntarily.
For similar reasons related to the development of the minds of children, "Of
necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and
child.' '275 Thus, the formal law tends generally to stop at the threshold of mediating
institutions, not only because it should not regulate developmental or intellectual
intimacy, but because it cannot regulate such delicate processes without impairing
their existence. The momentum of the formal law since the 1960s has been toward
ever increasing intrusions into the intimate realm of mediating institutions, including
schools.276 However, the Court's emerging recognition of institutional autonomy for
academic institutions in the name of first amendment values shows its willingness to
draw upon a potent doctrinal concept to shore up the boundary between intimacy and
the formal law-not to shield educational institutions from meeting their obligations,
but to make them more able to do So. 2 77
This does not mean, of course, that the Court is returning to the child saver era
when the discretion of school officials was, as a practical matter, beyond judicial
review. The Court clearly rejected that extreme position in deciding that the actions
of school officials are limited at the outer edges of discretionary judgment by the
specialized constitutional rights of their students in such areas as procedural due
process,2 78 fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, 279 and freedom of expression. 280 The spirit of these cases seems designed not
to supervise a school's performance of its curricular and extracurricular educational
273. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 Am. J. Jums. 1, 33 (1969).
274. See supra sections 1I.A.-II.B.
275. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
276. See supra section I.B. 1.
277. As stated by James Perkins, former president of Comell University:
Institutional autonomy is the surest guardian of academic freedom. To shift from the rules and procedures that
academic institutions have evolved as central to the teaching-learning process and to put academic discipline,
appointment, grading, and all manner of educational requirements at the mercy of the courts would mean, quite
simply, that civil jurisdiction over intellectual inquiry would be complete ....
Perkins, The University and Due Process, 62 Am,. LIB. BuLL. 977, 981 (1968), quoted in Private Universities: The
Right to Be Different, It TuLsA L.J. 58, 60 (1975).
278. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
279. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
280. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
19871
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
mission, but to ask for the most basic level of fairness in managing the school's
operational affairs. 281 Thus, the scope of an educational institution's first amendment
autonomy is likely to be affected by (1) its adherance to a threshold level of fairness,
(2) "the extent to which constitutionally protected values are inherent in the internal
processes of the institution, and [3] the likelihood that [judicial] intrusion will disrupt
such processes." 282
When a school is appreciated as an instrumentality whose most essential purpose
is to promote the underlying values of the first amendment, one is less likely to
assume that the only way to assert first amendment values is to limit the discretion of
teachers and school administrators.
C. Fraser Builds a Tinker's Dam: 83 Regulation of Student Expression that
Implicates Educational Policy
Guided by the perspective of recent educational history, the concept of schools
as mediating institutions, and the constitutional doctrine that schools are entitled to
some form of educational autonomy, I turn finally to the matter of a school's control
of student expression in co-curricular and extracurricular activities. Such a specific
application of the more general material that precedes this Section is in large part
illustrative. It may also lend perspective to the issues in Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
School District, which the Court will decide during its 1987 Term.
By applying the heavy constitutional weights that anchor the concept of freedom
of expression, many lower court decisions since Tinker have accepted as their major
analytical premise a substantial presumption against a school's controlling its own
overall environment and at least some of its own educational policies. Despite
acknowledgements in Tinker (and in most lower courts since then) that stress the
"special circumstances of the school environment" and "emphasize the comprehen-
sive authority of ... school officials," 284 and despite attempts by Justice Fortas'
majority opinion to confine the holding to "personal intercommunication" that is
unrelated to "the work of the schools," '28 5 the reality is that most post-Tinker
decisions begin with the assumption that any student expression is protected unless it
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others." '286 Thus, when students have chosen to express themselves, the
burden is placed on school personnel to justify any limitations with convincing
affirmative proof that the expression invades the curriculum, is seriously disruptive,
or inflicts apparent harm on other persons.
281. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3169 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
282. Durham & Oaks, Constitutional Protections for Independent Higher Education: Limited Powers and
Institutional Rights, in CHURCH AND Corsica: A VITAL PARTNERSHIP 69 (1980).
283. For additional comparison of the Fraser and Tinker cases, see supra section I.C.4.
284. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).
285. Id. at 512, 508. The wearing of the armbands was "a silent, passive expression of opinion" that did not rise
to the level of a "group demonstration." Id. at 508.
286. Id. at 513, quoted in Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 48:663
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS MEDIATING STRUCTURES
This was the essential approach of the Eighth Circuit in Kuhlmeier, which
construed each significant issue of law or fact in favor of the constitutional
presumption against regulation. The court of appeals held that a high school
principal's refusal to publish stories authored by student members of the school paper
staff violated their first amendment rights. It overturned the trial court's finding that
the paper was part of the curriculum 287 as well as its findings concerning the
principal's basis for believing that publication of the disputed stories could harm
members of the student body or other persons. The court concluded that legal tort
liability was the only "invasion of the rights of others" that would justify
non-publication. The court saw no basis for believing that the school incurred a risk
of liability for invasion of privacy from the families implicated in the stories, because
the parents were not named and their children who were identified "fully con-
sented."288
The Ninth Circuit had taken a similar approach in upholding the free speech
rights of Matthew Fraser, concluding that a student body assembly which all
"students were required to attend ... or report to study hall" 289 was not part of the
high school's curriculum and that there was insufficient proof of material disruption
or harm.
But the Supreme Court approached Fraser with a different set of attitudes,290
finding that "the process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is
not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class." Citing a phrase from
Tinker, the Court described the values taught in the conduct of a student body
assembly as "truly the 'work of the schools,"' because what happens in such a
setting implicates the educational mission of a school, teaching its students "by
example" through the actions of "teachers-and indeed ... older students" who are
"role models" for teaching "civil, mature conduct." ' 29'
By looking to the inculcation of "the habits and manners of civility as
values ... conducive to happiness and ... indispensable to the practice of self-
government" 292 as a basis for regulating the expression of students, the Fraser Court
introduced a major element that has been missing through much of the post-Tinker
era: the first amendment interests of both students and society in sustaining the
institutional authority of a school in fulfilling the broad educational goals of the
public school system. While the Court did not use the language of institutional
academic freedom, its opinion reflects that spirit. Moreover, the Court's references
to "the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis" as "role
287. The paper was produced by a regular journalism class taught by a faculty member for credit "within the
adopted curriculum," according to school board policy. However, the appellate court was persauded by the paper's
tradition of student editorial discretion, its status as a "student newspaper," and its publicly stated commitment to the
principles of responsible journalism and the first amendment. 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 & n.3 (1986).
288. Id. at 1376. The court did not address whether minor children could legally provide such consent in ways that
immunize against tort liability. The court was also unimpressed that the students whose stories were not published in the
paper were not disciplined for distributing photocopies of the stories on the campus. Id. at 1371.
289. 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3162 (1986).
290. See supra section I.C.4.
291. 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986) (emphasis added).
292. Id. at 3164.
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models" 2 93 carries distinct echoes of the concept of public schools as unique
mediating institutions, whose combined nurturing and educational roles for school-
age children draws upon the most fundamental First Amendment values.2 94 A school
is thus responsible not just to teach a narrow academic curriculum, but is to promote
the "shared values of a civilized order" according to its professional judgment.
Even in the unusually fractured opinions in Board of Education v. Pico, where
the three-member plurality distinguished between a school board's "absolute
discretion in matters of curriculum" and its reduced discretion in the school library
as the "regime of voluntary inquiry," 2 95 the Court had unanimously acknowledged
the board's discretionary right to order text books, library books, and even to remove
library books-if dictated by the board's judgment regarding pervasive vulgarity or
"educational suitability."' 29 6 The plurality's example of an inappropriate use of
discretion in the library was the removal of all books written by members of one
political party or one race, which suggests that the standard of educational suitability
would necessarily be as broad as it is subjective.
This standard for review of alleged "official suppression of ideas" based on
non-educational motives is not far removed from the test expressed by the Court in
Ewing, which upheld the institutional freedom of a university in making academic
judgments, so long as the institution relies on "reasoned academic decision-
making": "This narrow avenue for judicial review precludes any conclusion that the
decision ... was such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment.''297
When Fraser and the overtones of Pico are combined with Ewing, the Court
seems to view a school's educational policy decisions with a strong, even constitu-
tional, presumption of validity. Because Ewing dealt with a relatively specialized
academic judgment, its standard may not apply outside a narrow definition of the
curriculum. However, given the broad educational mission of public schools
described in Fraser, given the immaturity of the students, and given the unique
commitment of the schools to the affirmative fostering of first amendment values in
its total educational program, judicial deference toward the exercise of institutional
discretion is appropriate in a public school's curricular and extracurricular mat-
ters.
298
The significance of recognizing institutional academic freedom in such cases is
that this right establishes "a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First
Amendment," 299 which gives constitutional status to the institution's educational-
not merely curricular-judgments, thereby balancing the scales that had been
weighted against institutional judgment by the prevailing interpretations of Tinker.
293. Id. at 3165.
294. See supra section II.B.
295. 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
296. Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
297. 106 S. Ct. 507, 515, 514 (1985).
298. The standard established inEwIng actually allows more room forjudiac review than the Pico plurality seemed
willing to accept regarding curriculum-based decisions--"absolute discretion." 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
299. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
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Applied in student expression claims, this constitutional position places the burden on
the student to show a clear abuse of discretion. This analytical posture bears close
resemblance to the careful position Justice Harlan took in dissenting from the holding
in Tinker:
I certainly agree that state public school authorities in the discharge of their responsi-
bilities are not wholly exempt from the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment respecting
the freedoms of expression and association. At the same time I .. .believe ... that school
officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order in
their institutions. To translate that proposition into a workable constitutional rule, I would,
in cases like this, cast upon those complaining the burden of showing that a particular school
measure was motivated by other than legitimate school concerns ... [I find] nothing in the
record which impugns the good faith of [the school board] in promulgating the armband
regulation .... 300
Such a formulation would reverse the anti-institutional presumption created by most
readings of Tinker. It would strongly discourage the courts from second-guessing
even "unwise" educational judgments and would encourage courts to resolve
questions of fact or law in favor of educational policy makers, while still providing
for protection at the extremes against decisions that go "beyond the pale of reasoned
academic decision-making. "301
The application of institutional academic freedom to the extracurricular context
was clarified by Justice Stevens' opinion in Fraser, even though Justice Stevens
dissented from the result because he concluded that the student had not been given
adequate warning of the consequences of his speech. He
assume[d] that high school administrators could prohibit [even mild profanity] in classroom
discussion and even in extracurricular activities that are sponsored by the school and held on
school premises. For I believe a school faculty must regulate the content as well as the style
of student speech in carrying out its educational mission30 2
He amplified this view by quoting his earlier opinion in Widmar v. Vincent, which
favored the right of a university to exercise educational judgment in allocating the
uses of its facilities for extracurricular activities. 30 3
The logic of this deference to a school's educational policy choices naturally
extends to the purchase of library books, the selection of school plays, the content of
student assemblies, the nature of student activities, and the content of campus
newspapers. That such activities are "for students" and frequently involve student
leadership and participation does not remove them from the overall educational
program-the "work of the school." Decisions regarding the use of column inches
in a newspaper or yearbook or the air time on a school radio station necessarily
300. 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
301. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 515 (1985).
302. 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3169 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
303. In Widmnar, Justice Stevens focused on the limited resources of universities, which necessitate constant
judgments about "the use of the time and space that is available for extracurricular activities." Judgments about whether
to use a school stage for Mickey Mouse cartoons or to rehearse Hamlet "should be made by academicians, not by federal
judges, and their standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like 'compelling state
interest."' 454 U.S. 263, 278-79 (1981).
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involve educational judgment, not only regarding the use of school resources, but
also regarding educational suitability.
The argument that school officials should not in such circumstances "circum-
scribe the range of ideas" to which students may be exposed is simply naive about
the very nature of decisions affecting every facet of a school's curricular and
extracurricular program. Every decision made by a faculty member or administrator
in these areas may limit or expand the range of ideas or opportunities for student
expression-that is the very nature of applying educational philosophy and method-
ology to educational matters.
To assume that students' views should control such decisions because a school
looks like a public forum overlooks the analytical prerequisite that the "marketplace
of ideas" concept is inapplicable in its traditional sense to public schools. 304 It also
overlooks the extent to which deference to institutional judgments of this kind
actually promotes rather than inhibits the educational and other first amendment
interests of students, because the judgments are being made by educators whose
training and highest obligations are directed toward the educational interests of their
students. 305
This does not mean that the range of ideas presented through extracurricular
forums is of no constitutional conseqence; rather, it means that the relevant judgment
calls are matters of educational policy within the framework of a school's own first
amendment interests in institutional academic freedom, not matters requiring
ongoing judicial supervision. If either a student or her parents wish she could express
herself in ways not within the choices offered by the extracurricular policy framework
or if she wishes to have access to ideas not contained in the school paper or the school
library, she still has the entire off-campus world in which to explore her interests in
the same way as do other citizens of her age. In addition, as noted below, the
on-campus expression of her personal beliefs in ways that do not depend upon access
to curricular or extracurricular educational policy forums is still assured by the
continued viability of Tinker.
Consider the application of this perspective to student newspapers. The decision
to establish a high school paper, followed by decisions about academic credit,
funding, advertising, faculty supervision, and student editorial autonomy, all involve
a public school directly in determining "on academic grounds ... what may be
taught [and] how it shall be taught. 306 The educational objectives of such decisions
could include the teaching of writing ability, the value of interchanging ideas in a free
society, and the development of editorial judgment. They could also include a
concern for educating the social and intellectual understanding of the general student
body-an educational policy issue not unrelated to the values of citizenship and
public discourse recognized by the Court in Fraser. The extent to which the paper
operates as an open public forum or a conduit for student expression in this context
is a matter of educational policy, subject to correction based on experience.
304. See supra section II.C.1.
305. See supra section II.B.
306. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Courts that view school newspapers in terms of adult civil liberties approaches
to public forums are typically myopic about this large and significant educational
context. Whether a school wishes to expand or contract editorial responsibility at a
given time calls for educational judgments, depending upon the school's educational
objectives and the responses of its students. Only when a school's decision not to
print a student story goes beyond the realm of professional educational judgment is
it appropriate for a court to accept a challenge to the school's institutional academic
freedom. Whether the story would cause a disturbance or would risk harm to other
persons are also relevant considerations, but they are only two among many other
factors calling for broad professional judgment. Only by careful review of students'
proposed publication projects can faculty members teach them; only by exerting some
influence over the taste, the academic quality, and the normative impact of material
distributed throughout a school can the faculty discharge their responsibility to teach
the general studentbody "by example the shared values of a civilized social
order.'"307
This seems especially true given the school's ultimate responsibility-as the
publisher-for what is published, whether that responsibility is viewed as the risk of
tort liability or the risk of the school's reputation among parents and members of the
public. It is a strange theory of first amendment rights for minor children that gives
student reporters more discretion than their "real world" counterparts enjoy: editorial
discretion regarding publication has itself been deemed a publisher's protected right
under the first amendment. 30
A major weakness in typical interpretations of Tinker is linked to the reasons
why a school newspaper is not a "public forum" in the traditional free speech sense.
The public forum concept should not ordinarily apply to children under the age of
mature capacity, because they lack the rationality that is prerequisite to participation
in the marketplace of ideas-both for a speaker to assume responsibility for her
expression and for a listener to evaluate what is said. 30 9 Therefore, school officials
must be concerned about the effect of official publications on readers who assume-
whether correctly or not-that anything printed in a school-sponsored publication
enjoys school endorsement. By analogy, the establishment clause prohibits public,
group prayers in schools even though similar prayers are permitted in governmentally
sponsored gatherings of adults. 310 Special sensitivity exists in public schools because
young students are incapable of evaluating whether public prayer constitutes official
endorsement of religion. These same concerns dictate that student editors should not
have discretion over the content of a school paper, because widely-publicized views
that appear to an inexperienced student to have school sanction can so easily take on
307. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986) (emphasis added).
308. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (unconstitutional to force a publisher to
publish that which "reason" tells him should not be published). It could be argued that students who have been given
delegated editorial functions in a campus paper should have similar discretion, but final authority about the exercise of
editorial discretion typically rests with those who have ultimate responsibility for a publication. In a commercial
publication, that is the publisher, in a school, it is the school officials.
309. See supra section II.C.1.
310. See supra note 203.
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a norm-establishing quality. 31' The potential for creating an appearance of official
endorsement through the printed word is high enough that even if not all students read
the school paper, those who do can be a psychologically captive audience.
In addition, the school paper and its impact necessarily implicate educational
policy judgments, if not judgments about curriculum. In evaluting such issues as the
likely psychological impact, the degree of offensiveness, the educational suitability,
or the potential for harm or disruption that might be caused by a story in a school
paper, educators must weigh an enormous number of empirical and judgmental
factors. These factors relate to assessments of a school's environment for learning,
the educational readiness of its students, and the pedagogical effects of alternative
decisions on both reporters for the paper and the student audience. Such complexities
make a public school a far different place from the typical "public forum" of the first
amendment tradition, because the potential for harm or disruption in a school is not
objectively knowable. 312 Therefore, the Tinker concern with "substantial disruption"
and "material interference," which should be considered "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment" 3 13 may be impossible to apply to most
public student expression, unless judges assume the educator's judgmental role of
evaluating empirical and pedogogical imponderables. For such reasons, Professor
David Diamond argues that Tinker was "fundamentally incorrect" and that to avoid
a transfer of pedagogical responsibility to the judiciary, courts should apply a
deferential minimum rationality standard to the decisions of educators affecting
student expression. 314
Even accepting this recommendation in the case of expression in the extracur-
riculum, a need remains to protect more private forms of student expression. First,
the constitutional test proposed above 315 shifts the burden to a student who believes
his expression is excluded from extracurricular forums for reasons unrelated to good
faith judgments concerning educational policy or the use of school resources.
Analytically, both the educational institution and the student have rights grounded in
academic freedom interests that are pitted against one another in such a case. The
burden is on the student because of the presumption in favor of institutional direction
of "the work of the schools," 3 16 which takes place pursuant to the overall judgment
of our system that school-directed education is our best response to the educational
311. For similar reasons, a school was allowed to bar student paper reporters from distributing a school-wide student
survey regarding sexual attitudes and practices, because it created a risk of "significant psychological harm" to immature
students who were asked to crystallize their views prematurely on such an intimate and personal subject. Trachtman v.
Anker, 426 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd in part, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925
(1978).
312. In other first amendment situations, such as the distribution of literature on a street comer, the ability of
the audience-passers-by, shoppers, and vehicular traffic--to function in the vicinity of the event is readily
ascertainable by objective observation. . . . However, in the public school context, perhaps no one, but
certainly not the judiciary, can readily ascertain the mental or emotional state that is necessary, appropriate, or
desirable for learning to take place.
Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. Ray. 477,
486 (1981).
313. 393 U.S. 503, 514, 506 (1969).
314. See Diamond, supra note 312, at 477-78.
315. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
316. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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rights of students below the age of majority. 31 7 The student would carry his burden
by showing that the school's decision was "such a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise
professional judgment" 318 or that the decision was based on the arbitrary suppression
of ideas with no rational basis related to educational suitability31 9 or to "habits and
manners of civility.''320
Second, the kind of "personal intercommunication" 3 2 1 protected in Tinker is
entitled to first amendment protection because it neither involves, depends upon, nor
adversely affects educational policy or the "captive audience" of a public school's
curricular and extracurricular forums. Protection for such student expression arises
not from traditional free speech theories that presuppose mature rationality, 322 but
from notions about the coercion of belief originating in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.323
As a case involving a school's refusal to permit the "silent, passive expression"
of a serious, political, parent-supported belief, Tinker is thus the flip-side of Barnette.
Just as a school may not require a student's personal affirmation of belief, so it is
prevented from punishing a student for open affirmation of a belief. Coercive effects
of either kind run the risk of "strang[ling] the free mind at its source.' '324 Despite its
broader rhetorical flourishes in some portions of the majority opinion, the Tinker
Court did not dispute the school's right to control a political demonstration. Rather,
it disputed the school's characterization of the armbands, concluding that they were
not "even group demonstrations.' '32 5 In the Court's view, the armbands were
"entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct,''326 suggesting
that the actions of the school officials were akin to a regulation prohibiting students
from engaging in personal conversations with their classmates in criticism of the
Vietnam War. Suppression of a non-disruptive, private conversation implicates the
same coercive elements as arose in Barnette, especially when a particular belief or
viewpoint is singled out for proscription under circumstances where no use is made
of a curricular or extracurricular forum in any way that carries the potential
appearance of school sanction.
This interpretation of Tinker is arguably too narrow, because the students wore
their armbands in school classrooms, thereby bringing their expression from the
purely personal realm into a public forum. However, this fact alone falls short of
access to the mass communication channels of a school's curriculum or extracur-
riculum. The student forums mentioned in Tinker included such things as "in the
317. See supra section III.C.
318. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1985).
319. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982).
320. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986).
321. 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
322. See supra section II.C. I.
323. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
324. Id. at 637.
325. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
326. Id. at 505.
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cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours. ',327
Moreover, the outcome in Tinker could well have been otherwise had the record
demonstrated "any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption. ' 328
Tinker can be understood as belonging to the tradition of Barnette and the school
prayer cases, which-in part precisely because young students lack rational capac-
ity-seeks to maintain freedom of conscience and belief. Within this tradition, a
student's right of freedom of expression should, for example, protect her from
attempts by school personnel to require that she salute the American flag or to prevent
her personal, private prayer. 329
There is, then, a continuum of activity in a public school within which free
speech issues for students could arise. This continuum would place the classroom
curriculum at one extreme and private, personal intercommunication at the other.
Closely akin to the curriculum is the school library, followed by extracurricular
activities having strong educational content-such as student publications, election
assemblies, and performing arts programs. School-sponsored activities of a strictly
social kind are a step further removed from the curriculum, but can still have a
relationship to the broad educational mission of public schools. Routine administra-
tive concerns that do not implicate a school's educational mission, such as operation
of the physical plant or internal management of non-faculty employees, would fall
outside the protected sphere of institutional academic autonomy. The content of
private student interpersonal communication in such places as school grounds and the
cafeteria-the sphere protected by Tinker-would also lie beyond the reach of
institutional academic freedom, but would remain subject to Tinker's concerns with
disruption or harm. Acceptance of this' perspective subjects institutional decisions
within the educationally protected area to only rational basis scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Eva Brann wrote that American education "embodies certain root dilemmas"
that originate "in the very foundation of this country." She described these paradoxes
as "a dilemma in the thing itself, . . . a grave difficulty that enhances rather than
degrades its matter.' '330 Our system of public education was established to mediate
and facilitate the perpetual tensions within these dilemmas. A school aspires to be a
bridge between the private world of the individual and the public world of society,
helping each individual to realize his own autonomous sense of self while simulta-
neously inducting him into membership in the democratic community. He thus learns
to give as well as to take from the wellsprings of a free culture. To fulfill such
contradictory but lofty purposes, the school as mediating institution must itself be a
paradoxical construct, belonging both to the private world of the family and to the
327. Id. at 513-14.
328. Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
329. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
330. BRANN, supra note 20, at 1.
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public world of the state. Thus a school must reflect both institutional authority and
personal autonomy, private values and public virtues, excellence and equality,
neutrality and advocacy. 331
When functioning properly, schools can address these "grave difficulties" in
ways that enhance rather than degrade our personal and collective aspirations. It is in
school that a child has her first full opportunity to see society's plurality and to learn
by experience that she can live with others significantly different from herself without
ultimately yielding her own particularity. Indeed, her own particularity can itself be
enhanced by an ongoing process of self-definition that both shares and distinguishes
itself through the intimacy of life found in a tiny community of learning. From this
foundation springs our ability as a people to respect and sustain one another in our
larger communities of living. This was the vision that inspired not only Thomas
Jefferson, but Brown v. Board of Education, and the vision has been realized at least
enough to become a source of ongoing hope.
Even amid this hopefulness, however, the binding forces that hold the elements
of paradox in productive equilibrium have proven increasingly vulnerable over the
past generation. A complex variety of influences, including the possibility that our
sense of community was being too much imposed on an increasingly heterogeneous
culture, provoked a forceful reaction toward the individual side of the paradox,
re-creating both within and outside the schools Tocqueville's fear that our potent
individualism "might eventually isolate Americans one from another and thereby
undermine the conditions of freedom." 332
The origins of this development are by no means confined to recent conditions
in our legal and educational institutions. The entire history of Western civilization
since the medieval era represents a general movement toward individual liberation
from communitarian forces, a movement so broad that Robert Nisbet called it
"history as the decline of community." ' 333 While that process was long since
underway beneath the surface, it has erupted for all to see in our own day, as
ontological individualism has produced a "culture of separation. ' 334
This cultural fragmentation has both personal and institutional dimensions, but
has become especially visible in its impact on society's primary institutions,
including the schools. "Every major institution found itself dealing with people
unwilling to blindly accept customary responses." 335 In reaction, our social institu-
tions heightened the rhetoric of their public promises (including the rhetoric of
education in the early 1970s), only to create an irreconcilable gap between
expectations and fulfillment that led to "a lessening of institutional authority which,
331. For additional discussion on the theme of educational paradoxes, see supra notes 19-25 and accompanying
text.
332. BaLAt, supra note 190, at vii.
333. NtsBEr, supra note 162, chapter 4.
334. Bt tA, supra note 190, at 277.
335. Darrow, Changing Values: Implications for Major Social Institutions, in CuRRE' IssuEs i HIGHER EDuCA-ToN,
A.usucaN AssoaAIoN FoR HIGHER EDCATioN 13 (1979).
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in turn, caused increased institutional fragmentation under the stresses of... greater
complexity ... ,"336
Within the root dilemmas of education, the effect of this trend has been a kind
of prying apart of the productive paradoxes, creating ever greater distance between
the opposing links that must interact to sustain both educational and social processes.
As a result, we now sense increasing yet opposite pressures from the extreme edges
of the paradoxical concepts. From the schools' private heritage comes the instinct to
abandon the public school experiment and let each child and each family pursue its
own particularity, independent of the community as a whole. From the schools'
public heritage comes the urge to review every action within a school in federal and
constitutional terms, lest the spectre of discretionary autonomy mask the now
distrusted agendas of school personnel in positions of authority. Each of these
opposing fears works on the other, loosening the centers where they were once tightly
intertwined. As the schools try to contain this unraveling process, they can easily be
stretched beyond their capacity for meaningful response.
We can refresh our perspective on this unfolding pattern by asking once more
about the mediating nature of public schools. This not only clears our vision about
educational dilemmas, it also reminds us of the general place of intermediate
institutions as a crucial force in holding together the core paradoxes of the Republic.
The recently declining influence of these institutions in the overall constitutional and
policy framework suggests that the implications of this question in the educational
context extend to the larger process of working out our understanding of democratic
theory.
The "intellectual and moral associations" of democracy, so important to
Tocqueville that "nothing.. .more deserves attention, ' 337 protect both society and
individuals from the destructive extremes of anarchy and totalitarianism by combin-
ing personal liberty and social duty experientially into the lives of those who inhabit
the associations. Liberty and order are, after all, but opposite poles along a single
construct. Ultimately, neither is meaningful without the other. But in a world
inhabited only by the individual and the state, the choice is presented in mutually
exclusive terms: to submit to the social order seems to yield personal liberty to the
state. Hence the skittishness of recent lower court decisions unwilling to limit the
expression rights of school age children. It is precisely because of a school's dual
heritage, deeply rooted in both the public and private spheres, that it can innoculate
its members against the extreme of living out only one side of the paradoxes between
liberty and order, individual and community.
A strong degree of institutional autonomy is a crucial ingredient in empowering
the school's mediating role. Its governmental sponsorship keeps the school at a
desirable distance from the private sphere, imposing both affirmative and negative
constitutional obligations on the school as an arm of government in dealing with
people while providing a sustenance drawn from the larger republic itself. Yet its own
336. Id.
337. TocQuEvniu, supra note 166, at 517.
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enjoyment of a constitutional right of institutional academic autonomy keeps the
school at a desirable distance from the state, causing regulatory or judicial power to
"trail off as soon as it enters an area pervaded by first amendment values." 338
Surrounded by these buffer zones, the institution has room to do its work, holding the
root dilemmas together against pressures that would unravel them from either side.
This is an important form of containment, because when the core paradoxes are
disengaged at their intermediate center points, they begin to undo the ties that bind
the remaining social and political fabric together.
A school's mediating role and its distinctively blended character, quasi-person
and quasi-state, thus forge "a small republic of the intellect within the political
community. ' 339 As a center point in the long term relationship between liberty and
order, it is a "small republic" worth sustaining in an age when the risk increases that
the center cannot hold. 34 °
338. Durham & Oaks, supra note 282, at 75.
339. B.RA, supra note 20, at 146.
340. Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
W. Yeats, The Second Coming.
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